



The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)' was hailed as an
"emancipation proclamation" for people with disabilities at the time of its
passage in 1990.2 Since then, the Supreme Court has significantly limited the
scope and effectiveness of the ADA. Perhaps most significantly, in 2001, in the
case of University of Alabama v. Garrett, the Court found that Title I of the
ADA did not validly abrogate the sovereign immunity of the states.3 Three
years later, in Tennessee v. Lane, the Court upheld Title II of the ADA, but
only on an as-applied basis. Lane's as-applied approach, while favorable to its
individual litigants, renders it highly likely that some applications of Title II
will ultimately be subject to a successful sovereign immunity attack .
For obvious reasons, these developments have generated substantial
concern within the disability rights and academic communities regarding the
adequacy of alternative legal protections for individuals with disabilities.6
Despite this widespread concern, most of the legal scholarship that has
addressed post-2001 legal protections for individuals with disabilities has
discussed the ADA's predecessor, § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act,7 in only a
cursory fashion, if at all.8 This relatively skimpy treatment of the Rehabilitation
t Law Clerk to the Honorable Guido Calabresi of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit; J.D.,
Yale University 2004; B.A., Columbia University 1999. I would like to thank Drew Days, III for helpful
comments on earlier drafts of this article, Alan Schoenfeld for excellent editorial advice and assistance,
and Brett Dignam, for providing me with the opportunity to work on the cases that inspired this article.
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2000).
2. Robert L. Burgdorf, Jr., The Americans with Disabilities Act: Analysis and Implications of a
Second-Generation Civil Rights Statute, 26 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 413, 414 (1991) (quoting Sen.
Edward Kennedy).
3. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 360 (2001).
4. Tennessee v. Lane, 124 S.Ct. 1978, 1994 (2004).
5. See generally infra Section lI.B.
6. See, e.g., Ruth Colker & Adam Milani, The Post-Garrett World: Insufficient State Protection
Against Disability Discrimination, 53 ALA. L. REV. 1075 (2002); Bazelon Center for Mental Health
Law, The Garrett Case, at http://www.bazelon.org/issues/disabilityrights/resources/garrett/index.htm
(last visited Oct. 19, 2004).
7. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act is codified at 29 U.S.C. § 794. Section 504 and § 794 will
be used interchangeably throughout the article. Section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act, discussed infra, is
codified at 29 U.S.C. § 791.
8. See, e.g., Colker & Milani, supra note 6, at 1078-81 (noting that "[s]ome courts have also
applied sovereign immunity principles to conclude that... Section 504... cannot be used to obtain
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Act's protections has left a fairly substantial gap in the understanding of
whether the Rehabilitation Act may serve as an adequate substitute for the
ADA in the area of public employment and services.
While there has not been extensive academic treatment of the utility of §
504 since 2001, legal advocates have frequently raised § 504 claims since that
time.9 Many advocates had done so even before the Court's 2001 decision in
Garrett, despite the fact that § 504 claims were typically construed as
coextensive with claims brought under the ADA. 10 Post-Garrett, advocates
seeking damages have been compelled in many instances to rely on § 504
alone.' 1 Defendant states have fiercely contested § 504 claims on a number of
grounds; most ominously, they have sought to extend Eleventh Amendment
arguments to challenge the validity of § 504.2
Despite the potential seriousness of these sovereign immunity attacks, they
have garnered relatively little academic attention.' 3 This paucity of academic
monetary damages against a state entity," and therefore concluding that "state law may soon be the sole
remedy for individuals who face disability discrimination by the state"); Jaclyn Okin, Has the Supreme
Court Gone Too Far?: An Analysis of University of Alabama v. Garrett and Its Impact on People with
Disabilities, 9 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 663, 689 (2001) (devoting a short paragraph to § 504
in a more extended discussion of alternatives for enforcement post-Garrett); Michael Russell, The
Americans with Disabilities Act and the Eleventh Amendment: Do States Have a License to
Discriminate?, 28 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 133, 146 (2001) (discussing post-Garrett alternatives for
enforcement of disability discrimination protections against states, but mentioning § 504 only in a
footnote); Comment, A Return to State Sovereignty: How Individuals with Disabilities in Maryland May
Still Seek Relief Against State Employers After Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v.
Garrett, 31 U. BALT. L. REV. 67, 100 n.323 (2001) (same).
9. See, e.g., Koslow v. Pennsylvania, 302 F.3d 161, 166 (3d Cir. 2002) (raising employment
discrimination claims under § 504); Garrett v. Univ. of Ala., 223 F. Supp. 2d 1244, 1246-47 (N.D. Ala.
2002) (addressing the plaintiffs' § 504 claims on remand).
10. See, e.g., Doe v. Univ. of Md. Med. Sys. Corp., 50 F.3d 1261, 164-65 (4th Cir. 1995)
(discussing the plaintiffs § 504 and ADA claims together); McDonald v. Pennsylvania, 62 F.3d 92, 94-
95 (3rd Cir. 1995) (same).
II. See, e.g., Garrett, 223 F. Supp. 2d at 1251 (rejecting plaintiffs' remaining § 504 claims on
remand), rev'd 344 F.3d 1288 (11 th Cir. 2003); Johnson v. Lousiana, 22 NDLR P 172 (E.D. La. 2002)
(dismissing Title II claims against a state university, but declining to dismiss the plaintiff's
Rehabilitation Act claims).
12. See, e.g., Koslow, 302 F.3d at 167 (rejecting defendant's arguments for § 504's invalidity);
Garrett, 223 F. Supp. 2d at 1251 (finding that § 504 did not validly abrogate defendants' Eleventh
Amendment sovereign immunity), rev'd 344 F.3d 1288 (11 th Cir. 2003). For an academic piece arguing
that § 504 should be invalid under Eleventh Amendment doctrine, see Steven Plitt, Valerie Fasolo, &
Daniel Maldonado, Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama vs. Garrett: Is Constitutional
Authority for Sale and Is State Sovereign Immunity the Purchase Price?, 13 GEO. MASON U. Civ. RTS.
L.J. 151 (2003).
13. Where authors have addressed the sovereign immunity attacks that are being leveled on § 504,
they have often, without extensive discussion, assumed that those arguments are valid, and are likely to
lead to § 504's invalidation. See, e.g., Colker & Milani, supra note 6, at 1079; Note, Board of Trustees
of the University of Alabama v. Garrett: The Decision 's Impact on the Americans with Disabilities Act,
79 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 281, 299 (2002). However, many of the lower court sovereign immunity
arguments that are currently being raised against § 504 are either unsupported by existing precedent, or
have been of only temporary importance during the period of uncertainty regarding the continued
vitality of the ADA. See, e.g., Koslow, 302 F.3d at 170-76 (discussing reasons why defendants'
arguments against § 504 were not supported by precedent); Garcia v. S.U.N.Y. Health Scis. Ctr., 280
F.3d 98, 114-15 (2d Cir. 2001) (finding that the state had not waived its immunity under § 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act, because at the time of the waiver, they would have thought that immunity was
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attention is undoubtedly due in part to the informational gap that exists with
respect to the adequacy of § 504 as an ADA substitute. To the extent that the
significance of § 504 remains poorly understood, there is, and will continue to
be, little incentive for academics to develop arguments in support of its
continued validity. Thus, developing a better understanding of the scope of §
504's coverage, and the extent to which it is substantively comparable to the
scope of the ADA, may well prove critical in preserving the statute's long-term
enforceability.
In this Note, I will attempt to fill some of the gaps in existing legal
scholarship by providing a detailed comparison of § 504 and the ADA. Part II
will begin by providing an overview of Garrett and Lane and the degree to
which they do (or might) prevent suits against state actors from proceeding
under the ADA. Section III.A. will discuss the limitation of § 504's
applicability to entities that are recipients of federal funds, and will examine the
extent to which this renders its coverage less comprehensive than that of the
ADA. Section III.B. will explore specific differences between Title I of the
ADA and § 504, including differences regarding: 1) who can sue and be sued;
2) the applicable procedural and remedial schemes; and 3) the substantive
standards applied under the Acts. Section III.C. will address the same
categories of differences with respect to Title II of the ADA and § 504. Finally,
in Part IV I will discuss the conclusions that can be drawn regarding the overall
vitality of § 504 as a substitute for the ADA in the new federalism era.
II. ELEVENTH AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE AND THE ADA
To understand how well the Rehabilitation Act may compensate for
currently unviable ADA claims, it is first necessary to comprehend the scope of
the gap that it needs to fill. In order to provide this background referent, the
current treatment of the ADA 14 under Eleventh Amendment15 law is discussed
already lost pursuant to Title II); Brief of the United States as Intervenor, at 5-15, Patrick W. v.
Anderson, 165 F. Supp. 2d 1144 (D. Haw. 2001), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/briefs/lemahieu.pdf (last visited Oct. 19, 2004) (discussing at length reasons
why the defendants' arguments challenging the validity of § 504 were unsupported). Thus, developing
persuasive arguments now may well be successful in forestalling negative development in the law in this
area. For an article addressing in a limited fashion the sovereign immunity arguments that are being
applied to § 504 in the lower courts, see Roger C. Hartley, Enforcing Federal Civil Rights Laws Against
Public Entities After Garrett, 28 J.C. & U.L. 41, 89-92 (2001). For an interesting argument for why
Spending Clause legislation, as a general matter, should not run afoul of the Rehnquist Court's
sovereign immunity jurisprudence, see Rebecca Zietlow, Federalism 's Paradox: The Spending Power
and Waiver of Sovereign Immunity, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 141 (2002).
14. This section and, more generally, this Note will only discuss Titles I and II of the ADA, since
the other Titles of the ADA either generally do not impose substantive obligations or generally do not
apply to state actors. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181-12189 (2000) (Title III) (prohibiting discrimination in
public accommodations, but defining public accommodations to only include private entities); 47 U.S.C.
§ 225 (2000) (Title IV) (prohibiting discrimination by common carriers of telecommunications); 42
U.S.C. §§ 12201-12213 (2000) (Title V) (setting out miscellaneous provisions of the ADA).
15. The Eleventh Amendment provides that "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be
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below. The current availability of employment actions under Title I or Title II
of the ADA is discussed in Section A, followed by a discussion in Section B of
the availability of government programs and services actions' 6 under Title II.
A. Employment Actions Under Titles I and II of the ADA
As has been noted by both courts and commentators, both Titles I and II of
the ADA may provide a basis for raising employment discrimination claims
against state employers. 17  While Title II (which deals generally with
government programs and services) does not explicitly address discrimination
in employment,' 8 Title I does and clearly prohibits such discrimination by all
public and private employers exceeding certain minimum size requirements. 9
Title I of the ADA has, therefore, provided the primary basis since the passage
of the ADA for raising claims of disability-based employment discrimination
against state entities.20 It was, accordingly, a significant blow to plaintiffs'
ability to seek redress for employment discrimination when Title I was found
not to validly abrogate state sovereign immunity in University of Alabama v.
Garrett.
i. Title I: University ofAlabama v. Garrett
In University of Alabama v. Garrett, the Supreme Court found that Title I
of the ADA did not constitute a "congruent and proportional" response to a
history of unconstitutional state employment discrimination against people with
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United
States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. CONST.
amend. XI. The Supreme Court has made clear that it does not consider the Eleventh Amendment to be
the source of the states' sovereign immunity. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 713 (1999). For the
purposes of simplicity, however, I will refer to the states' sovereign immunity as "Eleventh Amendment
immunity," since that is the shorthand that the Court itself has traditionally utilized. See id.
16. "Government programs and services," where used in the disability discrimination context, is a
term of art that refers to the scope of coverage of Title II or § 504. It is not limited to what are
traditionally thought of as "services, programs, or activities," 42 U.S.C. § 12132, but rather extends to
"virtually everything a public entity does." Jones v. City of Monroe, 341 F.3d 474, 477 (6th Cir. 2003)
(quoting Johnson v. City of Saline, 141 F.3d 564, 569 (6th Cir. 1998)).
17. See, e.g., Bledsoe v. Palm Beach County Soil & Water Conservation Dist., 133 F.3d 816, 820-
25 (11 th Cir. 1998); Hartley, supra note 13 at 83.
18. 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2000).
19. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12132 (2001).
20. Plaintiffs occasionally brought Title I1 employment claims against state ntities even pre-
Garrett. The primary reason for doing so was to avoid Title I's requirement of exhaustion of
administrative remedies. Since Title 11 does not require exhaustion of administrative remedies, plaintiffs
who had failed to file a timely charge of discrimination with the EEOC could bring Title 11 employment
claims, but were foreclosed from seeking Title I relief. See, e.g., Zimmerman v. Oregon Dep't of Justice,
170 F.3d 1169, 1171, 1178 (9th Cir. 1999). In addition, post-Garrett, plaintiffs have brought
employment discrimination claims against state entities under Title II in order to avoid the sovereign
immunity restrictions that have been imposed on Title I. See, e.g., Koslow, 302 F.3d at 166 (discussing
the district court's dismissal of Plaintiffs Title II employment claims); Winokur v. Office of Court
Administration, 190 F. Supp. 2d 444, 448-49 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (dismissing the plaintiff's Title I claims
on sovereign immunity grounds, but allowing his Title II claims to proceed).
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disabilities. 21 This type of showing was required under the Court's City of
Boerne line of cases 22 in order to uphold Congress's attempted abrogation of
state sovereign immunity under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
23
Finding evidence of a pattern of historical state employment discrimination to
be lacking and the statutory response to be, in any event, disproportional to the
alleged violations, the Court held that the Eleventh Amendment barred private
parties from bringing damages actions under Title 1.24
Garrett, however, did not foreclose all possible avenues for seeking relief
from public employment discrimination pursuant to Title I. As observed by the
Court, the Eleventh Amendment has long been construed to bar actions against
state entities only in certain specific circumstances. As a result, there remain
post-Garrett several possible alternatives for individuals seeking relief from
state-perpetrated employment discrimination. First, state employers continue to
be liable under Title I for injunctive relief claims that are brought pursuant to
Ex parte Young. 25 Second, Title I claims brought by the United States against
state entities are not barred by the Eleventh Amendment, and can include
claims for damages brought on behalf of private individuals. 26 Finally, county
and local entities, although they are considered for other purposes to be arms of
the state, are usually not entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. Thus they
continue, in most circumstances, to be directly liable for both damages and
21. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 374.
22. In City ofBoerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997), the Supreme Court invalidated the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act (R.FRA) as not a "congruen[t] and proportional[]" exercise of Congress's
authority under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 520. Subsequent decisions reaffirmed
this requirement of "congruence and proportionality", and clarified the scope of the fact finding
requirements imposed on Congress as a result. See, e.g., Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S.
721, 737 (2003) (finding that the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) was a congruent and
proportional response to sex discrimination in state family and medical leave policies); Kimel v. Fla. Bd.
of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 82-83 (2000) (finding that the Age Discrimination in Employment Act was not
a congruent and proportional response to a history of unconstitutional age-based state employment
discrimination); College Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Ed. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 675
(1999) (finding that the Trademark Remedy Clarification Act did not protect "property rights" within the
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment and therefore that the Act exceeded Congress's Section 5
powers).
23. The Court had previously held that Congress may never, pursuant to its Commerce Clause
authority, validly abrogate state sovereign immunity. See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44,
72-73 (1996). Therefore, the plaintiffs in Garrett did not rely on the Commerce Clause despite the fact
that Congress indicated its intent to act pursuant to both its Commerce Clause and Fourteenth
Amendment authority in enacting Title 1. See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 364.
24. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 372-74.
25. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 374 n.9. See also Exparte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159-60 (1908) (holding
that state officials act ultra vires when they act in contravention of federal law, and that they can thus be
sued for injunctive relief for violations of federal law). Cf Koslow, 302 F.3d at 178-79 (rejecting
Eleventh Amendment challenge to plaintiffs' claims for ADA injunctive relief post-Garrett); Gibson v.
Ark. Dep't of Corr., 265 F.3d 718, 720-22 (8th Cir. 2001) (same).
26. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 374 n.9. The Supreme Court has consistently held that states do not retain
sovereign immunity in any action brought by the federal government. See, e.g., West Virginia v. United
States, 479 U.S. 305, 311 (1987). See also United States v. Mississippi Dep't of Pub. Safety, 321 F.3d
495, 499 (5th Cir. 2003) (overturning a district court decision dismissing Title I claims brought by the
United States on behalf of an individual).
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injunctive relief for actions taken in violation of Title 1.27
ii. Title II
In addition to these Title I avenues of redress, the question remains open
post-Garrett whether Title II provides a cause of action for employment
discrimination perpetrated by public entities. 28 There had been a circuit split
pre-Garrett on this issue, 2 9 which the Court declined to address in Garrett due
to a lack of appropriate briefing. 30 As a result, Title II employment
discrimination actions remain available as a matter of statutory construction in
some circuits, and could ultimately (depending on the resolution of the issue in
the Supreme Court) be available nationwide.
Unfortunately, whatever the ultimate resolution of the statutory
construction question, Title II seems unlikely as a matter of sovereign
immunity law to be found to validly abrogate state sovereign immunity in the
context of employment discrimination claims. As discussed at greater length
below, the Supreme Court in Tennessee v. Lane adopted an as-applied approach
to determining the validity of Title II's abrogation of state immunity.3 1 Unlike a
categorical determination of the validity of Title II's abrogation of state
sovereign immunity, this as-applied approach almost certainly will lead courts
to conclude that Garrett controls the validity of Title II's abrogation of state
immunity from employment discrimination suits. Therefore, while Title II
employment claims may ultimately be available under the same restricted
circumstances as Title I actions, they seem unlikely to afford plaintiffs a
materially improved basis for avoiding sovereign immunity constraints.
B. Title IT. Discrimination in Government Programs and Services
The scope of Title II of the ADA, however, extends far beyond the context
of government employment. Utilizing exceedingly broad statutory language, 32
Title II was, according to the Department of Justice, intended to extend to
"anything a public entity does." 33 As a result, Tennessee v. Lane was expected
27. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 369. See also Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529, 530 (1890)
(holding that the Eleventh Amendment does not prevent counties in a state from being sued in federal
court).
28. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 360 n.l.
29. Compare Zimmerman v. Or. Dep't of Justice, 170 F.3d 1169, 1184 (9th Cir. 1999) (finding that
employment discrimination claims are unavailable under Title II) with Bledsoe v. Palm Beach County
Soil & Water Conservation Dist., 133 F.3d 816, 825 (11th Cir. 1998) (finding that employment
discrimination claims can be raised under Title II).
30. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 360 n.1.
31. See Lane, 124 S.Ct. at 1994.
32. See 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2000) (indicating that "no qualified individual with a disability shall, by
reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services,
programs or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.").
33. 28 C.F.R. Pt. 35, App. A, § 35.102 (2004).
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to have dramatic results for the overall enforceability of the ADA. The
Supreme Court's approach in Lane, however, rendered the decision neither a
clear defeat nor a clear victory for proponents of Title II.
The most obvious manner in which Lane constituted a victory for Title II's
enforceability was in its specific holding. The Court held in Lane that, as
applied to the specific context of access to courts, Title II was "unquestionably"
valid Amendment 14 § 5 legislation.34 Thus, Lane ensured that access to courts
claims, as well as other comparable Title II claims, 35 would remain fully
enforceable against state actors.
Lane also marked a victory for civil rights statutory enforcement in other,
less direct ways. Prior federalism decisions of the Rehnquist Court had taken a
very narrow, ungenerous approach to evaluating the adequacy of plaintiffs'
evidence of a history of unconstitutional state action. 36 In Lane, the newly
forged majority37 moved away from this narrow approach, adopting a more
expansive understanding of what evidence could be relevant in establishing the
factual predicate for Section 5 action under City ofBoerne.38
Lane also, however, left broad areas of Title II's coverage vulnerable to
sovereign immunity attack. Under Lane's approach, the congruence and
proportionality test of Boerne will be applied to each of Title II's many areas of
applicability.39 Lane's more generous approach towards the adequacy of
statutes' evidentiary foundations undoubtedly will result in the courts
upholding more applications of Title II than they would have done applying the
more stringent Garrett test. Nevertheless, it is clear that many areas of Title II's
applicability remain likely to fail under an as-applied approach, even with the
benefit of Lane's more generous standard.4 °
34. Lane, 124 S.Ct. at 1993.
35. See infra notes 43-50 and accompanying text for a discussion of the types of Title II claims that
are comparable to the access to courts claims raised in Lane, and thus likely to be upheld.
36. See, e.g., Bd. of Trustees of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 368-72 (2001); United
States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 619-26 (2000).
37. It is not at all clear that the configuration of Justices that comprised the majority in Lane will
continue to vote together in Section 5 cases. If they do not, Lane's more expansive procedural approach
to the necessary factual prerequisite for Section 5 action may not prove to be enduring. For an
interesting discussion of the new voting alignment in Lane and its potential implications for future
Section 5 cases, see Simon Lazarus, Strategic Realignment on Sovereign Immunity and the Fourteenth
Amendment?, at http://www.acslaw.org/views/lazarus.htm (last visited June 13, 2004).
38. See Lane, 124 S.Ct. at 1988-92.
39. See generally Lane, 124 S.Ct. 1978.
40. Discouragingly, initial applications of Lane by the lower courts suggest that almost all areas of
Title II remain highly vulnerable to sovereign immunity challenges under Lane's as-applied approach
See e.g., Miller v. King, 384 F.3d 1248, 1275-76 (11 th Cir. 2004) (concluding that Title II does not
validly abrogate state sovereign immunity "as applied" to prison conditions claims); McNulty v. Bd. of
Ed. of Calvert County, No. DKC 2003-2520, 2004 WL 1554401, at *3-4 (D. Md. July 8, 2004)
(concluding that Title II does not validly abrogate state sovereign immunity "as applied" to education
related claims); Haas v. Quest Recovery Servs., 338 F. Supp. 2d 797, 801-03 (N.D. Ohio 2004)
(concluding that Title II did not validly abrogate state sovereign immunity as applied to claims sounding
fundamentally in equal protection); Roe v. Johnson, 334 F.Supp.2d 415, 422-23 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)
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While it will take years of litigation to resolve conclusively which areas of
Title II remain enforceable against the states, it is clear that three factors are
likely to play a significant role in making those determinations. First, as Lane
itself demonstrates, the courts will have significant leeway in determining how
to define the right at stake in any given as-applied challenge. This is important,
as the Lane inquiry is contingent to a large extent on both the nature of the
underlying rights, and the existence of a history of rights violation by state
actors. Thus, this initial defining step may well be determinative of whether
specific areas of Title II are upheld.4 1
The existence of a documented history of unconstitutional state action will
also play a vital role in determining what applications of Title II constitute
valid exercises of Congress's Amendment 14 § 5 authority.42 Because Congress
swept very broadly in enacting Title II, there are many applications of the
statute that may not, standing alone, have a well-documented factual predicate.
As a result, the existence (or non-existence) of a specific documented history of
unconstitutional state action is likely to prove to be one of the most critical
determinants of the validity of specific applications of Title II.
Finally, the nature of the Fourteenth Amendment rights that undergird the
specific application of Title II being challenged is likely to be significant in two
distinct ways. First, as indicated in Lane and in the Court's prior decision in
Hibbs, the Court will afford greater latitude in its congruence and
proportionality inquiry where the underlying constitutional rights compel a
heightened standard of review. 43 As a result, applications of Title II that
(concluding that Title II did not validly abrogate state sovereign immunity as applied to the state bar
admission process). Cf Phiffer v. Columbia River Corr. Inst., 384 F.3d 791, 792-93 (9th Cir. 2004)
(adhering to pre-Lane circuit precedent that had found Title II to be valid in its entirety, and thus
declining to take an as-applied approach).
41. The potentially critical nature of this initial determination is illustrated by the Court's decision
in Lane. One of the plaintiffs in Lane, Beverly Jones, was a court reporter who alleged that courthouse
architectural barriers had caused her to miss out on the opportunity to participate in certain court
proceedings. See Lane, 124 S.Ct. at 1983. Evidently, had the court chosen to construe her claims as
fundamentally sounding in employment discrimination, they would have been barred in an as-applied
challenge under Garrett. Cf Reply Brief of Petitioner at *4, Tennessee v. Lane, 124 S.Ct. 1978 (2004)
(No. 02-1667) (arguing that Jones' claims sounded fundamentally in employment discrimination and
that there is no "fundamental right to earn one's living as a court reporter"). Even had the Court only
considered the right implicated to be the right of the public to have access to court proceedings, rather
than more generally the right of "access to courts" (which also incorporates the right of individuals to
access to court process), Jones' claims might well have been found on an as-applied basis not to be
supported by an adequate history of discrimination. Cf Muntaqim v. Coombe, 366 F.3d 102, 126 (2d
Cir. 2004) (in a Voting Rights Act case, requiring the plaintiff, in defending the VRA "as applied" to
felon disinfranchisement statutes, to demonstrate a history of unconstitutional attempts on the part of the
state to use felon disinfranchisement statutes to discriminate on the basis of race, and concluding that the
plaintiff had not adequately made such a showing), reh "g en banc denied, 2004 WL 2211593 (2d Cir.
2004).
42. See, e.g., Lane, 124 S.Ct. at 1990-92 (discussing the history of discrimination that prompted the
enactment of Title II); Garrett, 531 U.S. at 371 & n.7 (emphasizing the lack of evidence of a history of
unconstitutional discrimination against the disabled in the employment discrimination context).
43. See Lane, 124 S.Ct. at 1988; Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 735-36.
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implicate disabled individuals' fundamental constitutional rights are more
likely to be upheld than those that do not.44
Second, Title II applications that implicate Constitutional rights that may
require reasonable accommodations seem significantly more likely to be upheld
than those that derive from Constitutional rights that do not. As noted in
Garrett, the ADA's reasonable accommodation mandate offers protections that
are materially different in kind than those that are afforded, for example, under
the Equal Protection Clause.45 Other constitutional protections, however, such
as the right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment,46 themselves
incorporate an implicit right to reasonable accommodations in some
circumstances. 47 As a result, it should be easier to establish the congruence and
proportionality of Title II where it can be seen as a response to those types of
Constitutional violations.4 8
There are therefore significant areas of Title II's applicability that seem
likely to remain fully enforceable against state actors. Many other applications,
however, seem unlikely to survive an as-applied challenge to their validity.
Many, if not most of these other applications, furthermore, are probably not
supportable as exercises of other areas of Congress's legislative authority (e.g.,
the Commerce Clause). 49 As such, they may well be rendered totally
unenforceable, even in those circumstances where sovereign immunity
exceptions such as Exparte Young would otherwise apply.
50
44. See, e.g., Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 735-36 (in case implicating sex discrimination, distinguishing
Garrett based on the lower standard of scrutiny that is applied to disability discrimination). See also
McNulty, 2004 WL 1554401, at *3 (emphasizing that education is not a fundamental right in concluding
that Title II does not validly abrogate state sovereign immunity "as applied" to education).
45. See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 372.
46. Because the Eighth Amendment is applied to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment's due
process clause, it is among the Fourteenth Amendment protections that Congress may seek to enforce
pursuant to Amendment 14 § 5.
47. See, e.g., LaFaut v. Smith, 834 F.2d 389, 394 (4th Cir. 1987) (concluding that a failure to
provide accommodations necessary to allow a disabled prisoner to toilet hygienically and without undue
effort constituted a violation of the Eighth Amendment).
48. Cf Lane, 124 S.Ct. at 1994 (noting that due process, like Title II, may impose affirmative
obligations on the state to make modifications in their practices where required in order to afford an
individual a meaningful opportunity to be heard). But cf Miller v. King, 384 F.3d 1248, 1275-76 (1 1th
Cir. 2004) (concluding that Title 1I does not validly abrogate state sovereign immunity "as applied" to
prison conditions claims).
49. See, e.g., Klingler v. Dir., Dep't of Revenue, 366 F.3d 614, 617-20 (8th Cir. 2004) (concluding
that Title 1I did not constitute valid Commerce Clause legislation as applied to the context of surcharges
imposed on handicapped parking placards); McCarthy v. Hawkins, 381 F.3d 407, 433 (4th Cir. 2004)
(Garza, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that Title II is not valid Commerce Clause
legislation insofar as "it regulates states' decisions regarding who will participate in or receive the
benefits of state entitlement programs," and that the majority erred in declining to reach the issue as part
of its interlocutory sovereign immunity inquiry); Brief for the United States at *11-12, Tennessee v.
Lane, 124 S.Ct. 1978 (2004) (No. 02-1667) (collecting cases presenting Commerce Clause challenges to
Title II).
50. See, e.g., Klingler, 366 F.3d at 614 (concluding that plaintiffs could not enforce Title II for Ex
parte Young relief because as applied it did not constitute valid Commerce Clause legislation).
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C. Conclusion
The full extent of the impact of the Supreme Court's decisions in University
of Alabama v. Garrett and Tennessee v. Lane remains uncertain. It is clear,
however, that disability discrimination claimants will not be able to enforce
certain areas of ADA coverage against the states, and that they will accordingly
require an alternative means of seeking redress. Most notably, employment
discrimination claims for damages, whether brought under Title I or II, seem
almost certain to be barred by sovereign immunity under the logic of Garrett
and Lane. While government programs and services claims fare better under
the logic of Lane, there are many areas of coverage where they too remain
highly vulnerable to sovereign immunity attack. Because many of these Title II
applications would not be supported by any alternate basis of Congressional
authority, they may be rendered totally unenforceable in the event they are
found to exceed Congress's powers under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
As a result, § 504, as the precursor legislation to the ADA, will almost
certainly be needed to provide an alternative remedy for all employment claims
for damages and for many government services claims of any kind. In the
following section, I will examine the degree to which § 504 can provide an
adequate substitute in these areas, comparing its scope to the scope of the
provisions of Titles I and II of the ADA.
III. APPLICATION OF THE REHABILITATION ACT WHERE THE ADA Is No
LONGER AVAILABLE
Evaluating the extent to which § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act 5' may
provide an adequate substitute for claims that are no longer viable under the
ADA requires a detailed comparison of the two Acts. Below, I set out such a
comparison, focusing on the three main categories of potential differences that
might exist between the Acts: 1) who can sue and be sued under the Acts; 2)
51. It should be noted that there are separate sections of the Rehabilitation Act, not all of which are
subject to the same standards. In particular, § 501, which applies to federal employment discrimination
claims, has been found by some circuits to impose somewhat different standards on employers than
§ 504. See, e.g., Woodman v. Runyon, 132 F.3d 1330, 1338 (10th Cir. 1997) (concluding that federal
employers may be subject to heightened reasonable accommodation responsibilities under § 501,
because of § 501's explicit affirmative action requirement). It is clear at a minimum that § 501 and § 504
are governed by separate administrative and remedial schemes, with § 501, like Title I, adopting Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act's remedial and procedural framework. See infra Section III.B. for a
discussion of Title I and § 504's remedies and procedures; see also 29 U.S.C. § 794a(a)(1) (indicating
that § 501 adopts Title VII's procedures and remedies). Because of these differences, some circuits
require federal employees to exclusively rely on § 501 where raising employment discrimination claims.
See, e.g., Boyd v. U.S. Postal Serv., 752 F.2d 410, 413 (9th Cir. 1985). Others allow federal employment
claims to be brought under either § 501 or § 504. See, e.g., Hall v. U.S. Postal Serv., 857 F.2d 1073,
1077-78 (6th Cir. 1988). In order to ensure accuracy in assessing the standards required under § 504, for
the purposes of this paper, Rehabilitation Act precedent involving federal employees was only utilized
where the employee relied on § 504 claims.
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what procedural and remedial provisions govern the Acts; and 3) what
constitutes a substantive violation of the Acts. Because § 504's primary
delimiting factor in the first category, federal funding, distinguishes it from
both Titles I and II of the ADA, this factor is discussed first, in Section A.
Section B discusses other differences between the provisions of Title I and §
504, following the category framework set out above. Finally, Section C
applies the same framework to the differences the exist between the provisions
of Title II and § 504.
It should be noted that this survey is limited in a number of respects. Title I
and Title II are each governed by a complicated network of statutory
provisions, regulations and precedent. 52 Section 504 is governed by even more
complex provisions, as it is subject to many different sets of regulations
promulgated by the numerous federal entities that award grants. 53 The courts
have, in many cases, not addressed the proper application of these statutory
provisions, regulations and precedents in the context of the respective acts
themselves, much less vis-t-vis each other.
Thus, I have adopted a number of limits on the scope of the issues that are
reviewed. First, and most significantly, consideration of § 504 regulations is
generally54 limited to the core set of "coordination regulations" promulgated by
the Department of Justice. 55 Second, differences in the statutes' and/or
regulations' 56 texts are not addressed where: 1) the courts have not yet
52. Dozens of pages of statutory text govern Titles I and II of the ADA. Thousands of pages of
regulations and regulatory guidance documents are also applicable to interpretation of the Acts. Finally,
more than a decade of precedent under Titles I and II interpreting the relevance of both general statutory
principles and specific statutory and regulatory textual mandates exist at the Supreme Court, Circuit and
District Court levels and must be applied to the statutes. Much of this precedent, furthermore, is
inconsistent both among, and often also within jurisdictions.
53. See, e.g., 28 C.F.R., Ch. I, Pt. 41 (Department of Justice coordination regulations); 45 C.F.R.
Ch. 45, Pt. 84 (Department of Health and Human Services regulations); 14 C.F.R., Ch. V, Pt. 1251
(National Aeronautics and Space Administration regulations).
54. Occasionally, the regulations promulgated by the then-Department of Health Education and
Welfare (HEW) (now the Department of Health and Human Services) shortly after initial passage of the
Act are also discussed. See generally 42 Fed. Reg. 22,676 (May 4, 1977) (setting out the original HEW
regulations). These regulations have often been treated by the courts as a valuable source of guidance on
the proper construction of the Act, and thus are more broadly relevant than other agency-specific § 504
regulations. See, e.g., Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 632 (1998) (noting that the 1977 HEW
regulations are of "particular significance" in interpreting the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act);
Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 305 (1985) (noting that the Court has frequently recognized the
1977 HEW regulations as "an important source of guidance on the meaning of § 504"); Consol. Rail
Corp. v. Darrone, 465 U.S. 624, 634 (1984) (noting the special status of he 1977 HEW regulations in
interpreting § 504). All references to Rehabilitation Act regulations are to the Department of Justice
coordination regulations, unless otherwise specified.
55. 28 C.F.R., Ch. I, Pt. 41.
56. The regulations of § 504 and the ADA are extensively relied on by the courts in adjudicating
disability discrimination claims, and have very rarely been questioned as valid interpretations of the
Acts. Given that Title I incorporates many § 504 regulations as part of its statutory text, and that Title II,
by statute, requires the re-adoption of many of § 504's government programs and services regulations,
this is probably a correct approach. See generally U.S. v. Awadallah, 349 F.3d 42, 54 (2d Cir. 2003)
(noting that "when a Congress that re-enacts a statute voices its approval of an administrative or other
interpretation thereof, Congress is treated as having adopted that interpretation, and the courts are bound
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differentiated the statutes on the basis of those distinctions; and 2) there are
substantial reasons (e.g., a mandate of consistency in the text of the statute) for
thinking that they will not do so in the future. Finally, because Title I and Title
II are each subject to a core provision mandating some sort of substantive
consistency with § 504, 57 my discussion of the differences in the substantive
standards of each Title and § 504 is framed around these provisions.
Approaching the comparison of the statutes in this way, there appear to be
very few significant distinctions between the Acts. As set forth below, both
Titles I and II deviate little from § 504 along the categories of substance,
suability, and procedural and remedial schemes. While there are, in some
instances, textual differences between the Acts or their regulations, these
distinctions are relatively minor, and tend in most instances to be minimized in
application by the courts. In the following section, the primary distinction
between the Acts-§ 504's limitation to recipients of federal funds-is
discussed.
A. Entities That Can Be Sued: Federal Funding and § 504's Applicability to
State Actors
The limitation of the applicability of the Rehabilitation Act to entities
receiving federal funds is by far its most salient difference from the ADA, and
was one of the primary constraints of the Act that advocates felt necessitated
the passage of a broader statute.58 It is not surprising, therefore, that in the wake
of Garrett, some academics have continued to cite this limitation in explaining
why the Rehabilitation Act constitutes an inadequate substitute in disability
discrimination suits against state entities.59 But while this limitation may
substantially circumscribe the utility of the Rehabilitation Act in addressing
discrimination by private actors, it should, as discussed below, generally be a
minor impediment in the area of state-perpetrated discrimination. A very large
proportion of state agencies are recipients of federal funds. The wording of §
504, furthermore, is sufficiently broad to encompass all of an agency's actions
irrespective of the breadth of the funding or the nature of the funding's purpose.
Therefore the vast majority of state actors who would otherwise be immune
from suit under the ADA should be subject to § 504 liability.
thereby") (internal citation and punctuation omitted).
57. See 29 U.S.C. § 794(d) (indicating that "[t]he standards used to determine whether [§ 504] has
been violated in a complaint alleging employment discrimination ... shall be the standards applied
under Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act .. "); 42 U.S.C. § 12134(b) (indicating that, with
limited exceptions, "[all] regulations [promulgated under Title II] ... shall be consistent with ... the
[DOJ] coordination regulations ... [that] appl[y] to recipients of Federal financial assistance under
section 504 .... ).
58. See, e.g., Burgdorf, supra note 2, at 431; Anne B. Thomas, Beyond the Rehabilitation Act of
1973: Title H of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 22 N.M. L. REv. 243, 245 (1992).
59. See, e.g., Okin, supra note 8, at 689; Russell, supra note 8, at 147.
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i. Section 504's Definition of "Program or Activity "
Section 504 states that "[n]o otherwise qualified individual with a disability
... shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination
under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.' 6° As
initially construed by the courts, this language limited the availability of
Rehabilitation Act suits to those cases where the specific program or activity
against which the individual had alleged discriminatory practices was a
recipient of federal funds. 6 1 In other words, receipt of federal funds by a single
program would be insufficient to subject all programs of a given entity to
liability for discriminatory practices prohibited by § 504.
This interpretation was overturned by statutory amendment in 1988.62 In the
Civil Rights Restoration Act, Congress inserted an extremely broad definition
of "program and activity" into the Rehabilitation Act.63 Under that definition, if
a state agency or other state entity receives federal funding for any purpose, 64 it
is subjected to § 504 liability for discriminatory practices in all of its programs
or activities.
65
As a result, if a state agency receives federal funding for any of its
operations or programs, it will be subject to § 504 suit. One can thus estimate
the likely coverage of the Rehabilitation Act (at least as constrained by the
Act's federal funding requirement) by assessing the extent to which most state
agencies receive federal funds.
66
60. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2004) (emphasis added).
61. See, e.g., Consol. Rail Corp. v. Darrone, 465 U.S. 624, 635-36 (1984) (incorporating meaning
of "program or activity" as construed by the Court in the Title IX context).
62. Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-259 (1988).
63. See 29 U.S.C. § 794(b) (2002). Under the statutory amendment, "program or activity" is
defined, in pertinent part, as
all of the operations of-(l)(A) a department, agency, special purpose district, or other
instrumentality of a State or of a local government; or (B) the entity of such State or local
government that distributes such assistance and each such department or agency (and each
other State or local government or entity) to which the assistance is extended, in the case of
assistance to a State or local government; (2)(A) a college, university, or other post-secondary
institution, or a public system of higher education; or (B) a local educational agency... ,
system of vocational education, or other school system; . . . any part of which is extended
federalfinancial assistance.
Id. (emphasis added).
64. On the rare occasions where the state is performing a service for the federal government (for
example, by housing federal prisoners in state prisons), the funds received will not be considered federal
funding that would subject the agency to § 504 liability. See, e.g., Logan v. United States, 193 F.3d 139,
1996 WL 717087, at *2 (9th Cir. 1996) (unpublished table decision). However, this type of quid pro quo
exchange is quite rare, and therefore one can generally assume that if a state entity has received federal
funds, it will be subject to § 504 liability.
65. See, e.g., Bentley v. Cleveland County Bd. of County Comm'rs, 41 F.3d 600, 602-03 (10th Cir.
1994).
66. While the "program or activity" definition enacted in 1988 was extremely broad, it appears that
it did not extend § 504 liability to all state subdivisions where the state itself is a recipient of federal
funds. See, e.g., Nelson v. Miller, 170 F.3d 641, 653 n.8 (6th Cir. 1999) (in dicta, rejecting argument that
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ii. State Agency Receipt of Federal Funds
The most accurate means of assessing whether most state agencies are
recipients of federal funds is to survey the proportion of entities receiving
federal funds in each of the individual states. Three states, California, North
Dakota, and New Hampshire, were selected for evaluation based on several
factors: 1) range in per capita federal aid received;67 2) geographic diversity;
6 8
3) population diversity; 69 and 4) availability of data. I then supplemented the
results of this survey by searching for Rehabilitation Act cases dismissed on the
basis of lack of receipt of federal funding. These combined approaches suggest
that while the applicability of the Rehabilitation Act may vary from state to
state, it is, in general, likely to be extremely broad.
California is the most populous state in the country, with approximately
twelve percent of the U.S. population residing there as of the time of the last
census.70 Its state government has approximately 110 agencies, 7' with a
cumulative annual budget of approximately $100 billion. 72 California ranks
27th among the states in per capita federal aid to state and local agencies,
slightly below the national average. 73 Because California is so populous, the
widespread receipt of federal funding by California agencies would be
indicative of the Rehabilitation Act's significance, if only because it would
demonstrate the Act's general applicability to more than one tenth of the U.S.
population.
A survey of the funding of California state agencies reveals that the vast
majority of state entities are indeed subject to Rehabilitation Act liability.
general receipt of federal funding by the state would subject all state entities to liability under § 504). As
a result, even if a state receives federal funding (as all do), it is necessary to establish that individual
state agencies received federal funding in order to subject them to liability.
67. A state in each of three categories was selected: high per capita receipt of aid, low per capita
receipt of aid, and average per capita receipt of aid. Per capita receipt of aid was relied on as the best
available indicator of the likely extent of state agency receipt of aid.
68. Geographic location was used as a means of partially accounting for political variation among
states in terms of attitudes toward participation in federal government funding programs. A state from
each coast and one non-coastal state were selected.
69. Two low-population states and one high-population state were selected. Population diversity
was included as a factor in state selection in order to account for the possibility that the distribution of
federal funds received among state agencies may be different in low-population and high-population
states.
70. Almost 34 million people resided in California at the time of the 2000 census. U.S. Census
Bureau, California QuickFacts, at http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/06000.html (last visited Oct.
19, 2004). There were about 281 million people in the United States at that time. U.S. Census Bureau,
USA QuickFacts, at http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/00000.html (last visited Oct. 19, 2004).
71. See State of California, California State Government: The Executive Branch, available at
http://www.cold.ca.gov/Ca StateGovOrgchart.pdf (last visited Oct. 19, 2004).
72. California Governor's Budget Summary 2002-03, at 87, available at
http://www.dof.ca.gov/HTML/Budget02-03/00_toc.htm (last visited Oct. 19, 2004).
73. U.S. Census Bureau, Federal Aid to States for Fiscal Year 2002, at x, available at
http://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/fas02.pdf (last visited July 24, 2004).
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Although available data allow for only fairly rough estimates, those estimates 74
suggest that approximately 95% of all California budget dollars allocated to
state agencies are received by entities that are also recipients of federal funds.75
Therefore, although some California state entities that would have been subject
to ADA liability will not be subject to the Rehabilitation Act's provisions, the
proportion of such entities is quite low.
In contrast to California, North Dakota is the third least populous state in
the country and is home to only approximately 0.23% of the United States
population.76 Its state government has approximately 55 subdivisions, with a
cumulative annual budget of approximately $4.4 billion.77 North Dakota ranks
fourth in the nation, well above the national average, in terms of per capita
receipt of federal aid.78 Despite these substantial disparities in per capita receipt
of aid, population, and state government size, the proportion of North Dakota
state entities that receive federal funds is remarkably similar to the proportion
of federal fund recipients in California. Better data is available for North
Dakota, and it can, therefore, be said with a fairly high degree of accuracy that
approximately 96% of all North Dakota budget dollars that are allocated to
state agencies or entities are received by entities that are also recipients of
federal funds.79
Finally, New Hampshire is the tenth least populous state in the country,
74. Estimates are drawn from data included in the California Governor's Budget Summary. See
California Governor's Budget Summary, supra note 72, at 87. As per the broad definition of programs
and services added in the 1988 amendments to the Rehabilitation Act, it was generally assumed that if a
division of a state agency received federal funding, the entire agency would be considered a recipient of
federal funding for § 504 purposes. Because of the relatively rough data used, estimates are not precise;
in order to counter the possible inflationary effects of using broad budget categories, where it was clear
from the data that a category included an agency not receiving federal funds that would likely be
considered a separate entity for the purposes of § 504 funding, that category was deemed non-federally
funded en toto for the purposes of the analysis. Funding estimates were based on 2002 budget data.
75. Proportion of budget dollars going to agencies that are also recipients of federal funds was
relied on as an indicator of § 504's applicability, rather than proportion of agencies receiving federal
funds, because the former was believed to be a better indicator of the breadth of § 504's applicability.
Because state agencies have vastly differing budgets, and because agencies with smaller budgets are less
likely to be involved in litigation, either as an employer or provider of public services, a straight
calculation of proportion of agencies receiving federal funds was thought to provide an unrealistic
estimate of § 504's total applicability.
76. Approximately 640,000 people resided in North Dakota at the time of the last census in 2000.
There were approximately 281 million people in the United States at that time. U.S. Census Bureau,
Annual Estimates of Population Change by State, available at
http://www.census.gov/popest/states/tables/NST-EST2003-0 
.pdf (last visited Oct. 19, 2004).
77. State of North Dakota, Executive Budget 2003-2005 Biennium, available at
http://www.state.nd.us/fiscal/budgetrecomm2003-05/Book2003-05.pdf (last visited Oct. 19, 2004). The
2003-2005 budget also included expenditures from the previous budget, which formed the basis for the
assessment of which agencies were recipients of federal funds.
78. U.S. Census Bureau, Federal Aid to States for Fiscal Year 2002, available at
http://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/fas02.pdf (last visited Oct. 19, 2004).
79. See id. Because of the availability of better data, and because North Dakota has far fewer state
sub-divisions and budget line items, the percentage of agencies directly receiving federal funds could be
computed with greater precision than in the case of California.
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with approximately 0.44% of the U.S. population residing there at the time of
the last census. 8 Its state government has approximately 41 subdivisions, with
a cumulative annual budget of approximately $3.9 trillion. New Hampshire
ranks 42nd in per capita receipt of federal aid, well below the national
average.81 In accordance with this low per capita receipt of federal funds, a
somewhat lower, but still substantial, proportion of New Hampshire budget
dollars (88%) is allocated to state agencies or entities that are also recipients of
federal funds.82 Like North Dakota, reasonably good data is available for New
Hampshire.
An examination of California, North Dakota, and New Hampshire therefore
suggests that a very substantial proportion of state budget dollars are allocated
to state entities that are also recipients of federal funding. While the proportion
of coverage may vary some from state to state, even those states with a low per
capita receipt of federal funds have a substantial proportion of their budget
dollars going to state entities that are recipients of federal funds. As a result it
seems highly likely that in most states, federal funding should not pose a
substantial obstacle to § 504 liability.
This conclusion is further buttressed by the fact that, since the amendment
of § 504 in 1988, very few Rehabilitation Act cases against state actors have
been dismissed on the grounds that the defendant was not a recipient of federal
83funds. Between the years 1988 and 2004, there have been only nine cases in
80. Approximately 1.3 million people resided in New Hampshire at the time of the 2000 census.
U.S. Census Bureau, Annual Estimates of Population Change by State, available at
http://www.census.gov/popest/data/states/tables/NST-EST2003-01 .pdf (last visited Oct. 19, 2004).
81. U.S. Census Bureau, Federal Aid to States for Fiscal Year 2002, available at
http://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/fas02.pdf (last visited Oct. 18, 2004).
82. State of New Hampshire, Governor's Operating Budget 2004-2005, available at
http://admin.state.nh.us/budget/budget03.pdf (last visited Oct. 19, 2004). The 2004-2005 budget also
included expenditures for Fiscal Year 2002, which formed the basis for the assessment of which
agencies were recipients of federal funds.
83. In order to assess the number of cases dismissed for lack of federal funding subsequent to 1988,
I searched the Westlaw ALLFEDS database in April, 2003 with the following query: ("rehabilitation
act" 504) /200 ("do not receive" "does not receive" "did not receive" "is not a recipient of' "was not a
recipient of") /100 (federal /5 fund!) & ti (alabama alaska arizona arkansas california colorado
connecticut deleware florida georgia hawaii idaho illinois indiana iowa kansas kentucky louisiana maine
maryland massachusetts michigan minnesota mississippi missouri montana nebraska nevada "new
hampshire" "new jersey" "new mexico" "new york" "north carolina" "north dakota" ohio oklahoma
oregon pennsylvania "rhode island" "south carolina" "south dakota" tennessee texas utah vermont
virginia washington "west virginia" wisconsin wyoming). This search was repeated in August, 2004 in
order to update the survey. Because of modifications made to the Westlaw database in the interim, the
survey update was conducted in the Lexis "Federal Court Cases, Combined" database, and was modified
to use Lexis fields and connectors. In addition to these Lexis and Westlaw searches, I surveyed cases
collected under two pertinent annotations. See James Lockhart, Annotation, Who Is Recipient of and
What Constitutes Program or Activity Receiving, Federal Financial Assistance for Purposes of§ 504 of
Rehabilitation Act (29 U.S.C.A. § 794), Which Prohibits Any Program or Activity Receiving Financial
Assistance from Discrimination on Basis of Disability, 160 A.L.R. FED. 297 (2000); James Lockhart,
Annotation, What Constitutes Federal Financial Assistance for Purposes of§ 504 of Rehabilitation Act
(29 U.S. C.A. § 794), Which Prohibits Any Program or Activity Receiving Federal Financial Assistance
from Discriminating on Basis of Disability, 147 A.L.R. FED. 205 (1998).
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which Rehabilitation Act claims against state entities were dismissed for lack
of federal funding. 84 In all but three of these cases either the § 504 claim itself,
or else identical ADA claims were rejected on the basis of defects adequate to
justify dismissal irrespective of receipt of federal funding. 85 Therefore, there
have been even fewer cases in which a state entity's lack of receipt federal
funding was in fact dispositive of a § 504's plaintiff s success. 8 6
Combined, these two findings strongly support the conclusion that in most
cases § 504's federal funding requirement will not constitute a bar to suit.
B. Employment Discrimination: Title I of the ADA and § 504
Two background provisions frame and largely control any discussion of the
differences between Title I of the ADA and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.87
First, and most significantly, § 504 was amended in 1992 to provide that "[t]he
standards used to determine whether this section has been violated in a
complaint alleging . . . employment discrimination ... shall be the standards
applied under title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act. ,,88 Of lesser but
also substantial import is a provision included in Title V of the ADA, but
applicable to the entire Act, which provides that "[e]xcept as otherwise
provided in this chapter, nothing in this chapter shall be construed to apply a
84. See Nelson v. Miller, 170 F.3d 641, 653 n.8 (6th Cir. 1999); Lightboum v. County of El Paso,
118 F.3d 421, 426-27 (5th Cir. 1997); Ramos v. Tex. Dep't of Criminal Just., 2002 WL 1492574, at *3
(W.D. Tex. 2002); Herschaft v. N.Y. Bd. of Elections, 2001 WL 940923, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. 2001); Root v.
Ga. State Bd. of Veterinary Med., 114 F.Supp.2d 1324, 1336 (N.D. Ga. 2000), rev"d in part and vacated
in part without decision, 252 F.3d 443 (1 1th Cir. 2001); Jones v. Pa. Minority Bus. Dev. Auth., 1999
WL 487025, at *8 (E.D.Pa. 1999); McDonald v. Massachusetts, 901 F. Supp. 471, 477-78 (D. Mass.
1995); Arroyo v. N.Y. State Ins. Dep't, 1995 WL 611326, *8 (S.D.N.Y. 1995), affd 104 F.3d 349 (2d
Cir. 1996) (unreported table opinion).
85. For decisions where funding was the dispositive issue, see Ramos, 2002 WL 1492574, at *3;
Root, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 1336; Arroyo, 1995 WL 611326, at *8.
86. From what minimal inferences can be drawn from the limited case law, it seems that the
greatest difficulties likely to be encountered in substituting § 504 for ADA claims are in the area of
voting rights. Apparently, the state entities responsible for implementing voting laws are frequently not
the recipients of federal funds. See, e.g., Nelson, 170 F.3d at 653 n.8; Lightbourn, 118 F.3d at 426-27;
Herschafi, 2001 WL 940923, at *2 n.4. Fortunately voting, as a fundamental right, may well be one of
the areas of Title II's application that is ultimately upheld under Lane.
87. Because it remains unsettled whether Title II of the ADA applies to employment discrimination
actions, this section will focus exclusively on Title I. It should be noted, however, that if Title I1 is
ultimately found to extend to employment discrimination, some of the disadvantages that ADA
employment plaintiffs may face vis-A-vis § 504 employment plaintiffs would be rendered immaterial.
Most importantly, as discussed infra, Title II adopts § 504's procedural and remedial scheme. Thus, if
employment plaintiffs had the option of bringing claims under Title II, many of the differences
discussed in Section III.B.ii. would be rendered unimportant. Similarly, Title II extends to all public
entities. Thus, some of the distinctions discussed in Section III.B.i. would be irrelevant if Title II were
construed to extend to employment claims. The substantive standards applied to Title 11 employment
claims are, however, simply those that would otherwise apply. See 28 C.F.R. § 35.140 (2004) (indicating
that Title l's substantive standards should apply where the defendant entity is also subject to Title I
liability, and that § 504 substantive standards should apply where the defendant entity is not subject to
Title I liability).
88. 29 U.S.C. § 794(d) (2000).
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lesser standard than the standards applied under title V of the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973 ... or the regulations issued by Federal agencies pursuant to such
title. 89
Taken together, these two provisions have usually led the courts to construe
Title I and § 504 claims as coextensive. 90 This tendency has been further
buttressed by the fact that the core anti-discrimination provisions of Title I and
§ 504 are very similar, and that much of the remainder of the far more
extensive Title I statutory text was modeled after pre-existing § 504
regulations.9' There is, therefore, fairly little case law discussing in any detail
the relevant differences between the Acts, beyond the obvious contingency of §
504 claims on the entity's receipt of federal funds.
It is clear nevertheless that there are several significant differences between
§ 504 and Title I. Most notably, courts have generally found that the 1992
amendments apply only to differences in what constitutes a substantive
violation of the Acts.92 As a result, differences continue to exist in who can sue
and be sued under the Acts, and in the Acts' procedural and remedial schemes.
In addition, some courts have, despite the 1992 amendments, continued to
recognize a substantial difference in the substance of what constitutes a
violation of the Acts. These recognized differences between the Acts, as well as
the possibility of further distinctions being drawn by the courts, are discussed
below.
i. Entities that Can Sue and Be Sued Under Title I and § 504
As has been noted by the courts, the 1992 amendments to § 504 "address[]
only the substantive standards for determining what conduct violates the
Rehabilitation Act, not the definition of who is covered under the ... Act."
93
Thus, to the extent that there are text-based distinctions between who can sue
and be sued under Title I and § 504, they should remain, despite the 1992
amendments. And indeed, where applicable, courts have continued to recognize
89. 42 U.S.C. § 12201 (2000).
90. See, e.g., Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 644-45 (1998) (applying § 504 case law to Title I
claim as per § 12201); Oliveras-Sifre v. Puerto Rico Dep't of Health, 214 F.3d 23, 25 n.2 (1st Cir. 2000)
(analyzing Title I and § 504 claims together as per 794(d)).
91. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (2000); 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2000); 28 C.F.R. §§ 41.52-.55 (2004). See also
McDonald v. Pennsylvania, 62 F.3d 92, 94-95 (3d Cir. 1995) (noting that many of the requirements of
the ADA were based on pre-existing § 504 regulations and therefore analyzing § 504 and ADA claims
together).
92. See, e.g., Freed v. Consol. Rail Corp., 201 F.3d 188, 194 (3d Cir. 2000) (rejecting the argument
that § 794(d) requires incorporation of Title I administrative exhaustion requirements and noting that the
aim of § 794(d) "is to achieve substantive conformity" between the statutes). But cf McCachren v.
Blacklick Valley Sch. Dist., 217 F. Supp. 2d 594, 599 (W.D. Pa. 2002) (stating in dicta in a Title II case
that in all disability employment cases, Title I remedies and exhaustion requirements apply as per the
1992 amendments).
93. Schrader v. Ray, 296 F.3d 968, 972 (10th Cir. 2002).
Vol. 23:271, 2005
Rehabilitation Act Redux
textual differences in who can sue and be sued under the Acts.94
These differences are not particularly extensive. Section 504 and Title I
define the class of plaintiffs entitled to sue identically, and there were and are,
therefore, no distinctions between which plaintiffs may sue under the Acts.
95
Differences in the type of employers that can be sued under the Acts exist, but
they are also relatively minimal. Section 504 applies only to entities that are
recipients of federal funds. 96 Meanwhile, Title I applies to employers who have
fifteen or more employees. 97 As a result, prospective § 504 litigants will be able
to raise claims against a class of defendants that is similar to the class of
defendants subject to Title I suit.
ii. Procedural and Remedial Measures Applicable to Title I and § 504
Much more substantial differences exist between Title I's and § 504's
procedural and remedial schemes. Title I provides, "The powers, remedies, and
procedures set forth in [relation to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964]
shall be the powers, remedies, and procedures this subchapter provides .... 98
In contrast, § 504 provides, "The remedies, procedures, and rights set forth in
[T]itle VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ... shall be available to any person
aggrieved by any act or failure to act by any recipient of Federal assistance...
,,99 The adoption of separate remedial and procedural frameworks for § 504
and Title I has a number of implications, which are largely favorable for § 504
94. See, e.g., id. (rejecting the argument that the 1992 amendments were intended to extend to who
can be sued under the Acts); Johnson v. N.Y. Hospital, 897 F. Supp. 83, 86 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (same). But
cf Romand v. Zimmerman, 881 F. Supp. 806, 812 (N.D.N.Y. 1995) (indicating that the ADA's
definition of "employer" extends to the Rehabilitation Act by virtue of the 1992 amendments
(§ 794(d))).
95. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2000) (Title I) (indicating that "[n]o covered entity shall discriminate
against a qualified individual with a disability") (emphasis added); 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2000)
(Rehabilitation Act) (indicating that "[n]o otherwise qualified individual with a disability ... shall,
solely by reason of her or his disability, ... be subjected to discrimination") (emphasis added). See also
29 U.S.C. § 705(20)(B) (2000) (Rehabilitation Act) (stating that "the term 'individual with a disability'
means . . . any person who (i) has a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or
more of such person's major life activities; (ii) has a record of such impairment; or (iii) is regarded as
having such an impairment"); 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (2000) (ADA general provisions) (indicating that
"[t]he term 'disability' means.. .(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or
more of the major life activities of [an] individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being
regarded as having such an impairment"); 42 U.S.C. § 12111 (2000) (Title 1) (stating that "[t]he term
,qualified individual with a disability' means an individual with a disability who, with or without
reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position that such
individual holds or desires"); 28 C.F.R. § 41.32 (2004) (Rehabilitation Act) (stating that "[q]ualified
handicapped person means... a handicapped person who, with reasonable accommodation, can perform
the essential functions of the job in question").
96. Obviously, this could potentially constitute a major distinction between the Acts, if many
members of the defendant class were not recipients of federal aid. However, as discussed in Section
I1A, supra, the vast majority of state entities receive federal funds.
97. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A) (2000).
98. 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a) (2000).
99. 29 U.S.C. § 794a(a)(2) (2000).
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plaintiffs in the employment discrimination arena.
Most notably, because § 504 adopts the procedural framework of Title VI
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (CRA),' 00 rather than Title VII of the CRA,'' §
504 plaintiffs are not required to exhaust administrative remedies prior to filing
suit.102 As a result, where a comparable Title I plaintiff would be barred from
filing in court for failure to first file a charge with the EEOC, a § 504 plaintiff
would not. 103 Similarly, the statute of limitations that accompanies § 504 claims
often significantly exceeds that afforded Title I plaintiffs.'4 While clearly these
issues will not arise in every case, where they are present, they typically will
mean the difference between a dismissal of claims and proceeding on the
merits.
Section 504 plaintiffs also have a more favorable remedial scheme
available to them once a showing of a violation of the act has been made.
Under Title I, plaintiffs who are suing government entities are subject to
capped compensatory damages awards. 10 5 Depending on the size of the
employer, the plaintiff will be limited in their recovery to an award of between
$50,000 and $300,000 (not including backpay or other equivalent equitable
relief). 10 6 In contrast, compensatory damages awards under the Rehabilitation
Act are uncapped and in fact sometimes exceed even the highest Title I
statutory cap of $300,000.107 Punitive damages are not available against public
entities under either Title I or § 504.108
Title I additionally limits award of damages to cases in which intentional
discrimination (defined in the Act as "not an employment practice that is
unlawful because of its disparate impact") or a failure to provide reasonable
accommodations is shown. 10 9 A complete defense to damages is afforded to
100. Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits racial and national origin discrimination by
recipients of federal funds. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d.
101. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, sex,
religion, or national origin by all employers. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2.
102. See, e.g., Freed v. Consol. Rail Corp., 201 F.3d 188, 194 (3d Cir. 2000) (rejecting the
argument that § 794(d) incorporates Title I administrative exhaustion requirement).
103. Id.
104. See, e.g., Alberti v. City of San Francisco Sheriff's Dep't, 32 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1171-72 (N.D.
Cal. 1998) (noting that a Title I plaintiff must file a complaint with the EEOC within 180 days of the
occurrence of alleged discrimination, but that § 504 plaintiffs are generally subject to a longer statute of
limitations, often based on the statute of limitations for personal injury actions); Winfrey v. City of
Chicago, 957 F. Supp. 1014, 1018, 1023 (N.D. Il1. 1997) (same).
105. 42 U.S.C. § 198 1a(b)(3) (2000).
106. Id.
107. See, e.g., Dahill, Jr. v. City of Boston, JVR No. 803070, 2002 WL 982343 (D. Mass. Feb.
2002) (LRP Jury 2003) (verdict award of $847,785 in § 504 case); Powers v. MJB Acquisition Corp.,
JVR No. 801160, 1998 WL 1670328 (Wyo. State Ct. Apr. 1998) (LRP Jury 2003) (verdict award of
$582,000 in § 504 case). See also Roberts v. Progressive Independence, Inc., 183 F.3d 1215, 1223-24
(10th Cir. 1999) (rejecting defendant's argument that § 504 damage award should be limited to amounts
allowable under Title I caps).
108. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1) (Title I); Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181 (2002) (§ 504).
109. 42 U.S.C. 1981a.
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employers who fail to provide reasonable accommodations, but who engaged in
"good faith efforts" to provide reasonable accommodations to the disabled
employee. 110 It appears that § 504 similarly requires a showing of intentional
discrimination, although this requirement has been interpreted differently than
it is defined in the remedial provisions governing Title 1.111 In general, damages
may be awarded for any kind of violation of § 504 so long as the plaintiff has
demonstrated "deliberate indifference" to the rights protected by § 504 on the
part of the employer. 112 "Deliberate indifference" is defined by the defendant's
"knowledge that a harm to a federally protected right is substantially likely, and
a failure to act upon that the [sic] likelihood."' 13 In practice, it seems likely that
these two standards will result in damages being awarded for substantially the
same kinds of conduct in violation of the Acts, namely disparate treatment, and
failure to make good faith attempts at reasonable accommodations."l4
iii. Differences in the Substantive Standards Applied to Assess Violations
of Title I and § 504
As articulated in the Senate Report accompanying the 1992 amendments,
the amendments were intended to "ensure uniformity and consistency of
interpretations" in the courts' determinations of what constitutes an
employment violation of the disability discrimination acts.' 15 The core import
of the 1992 amendments was, therefore, to ensure consistency in the substance
of what is found to be a violation under Title I and § 504. Courts have,
accordingly, rarely distinguished between § 504 and Title I in discussing the
types of employer actions that may violate the Acts. 1 6 There are, nevertheless,
110. Id.; cf Roberts, 183 F.3d at 1222-23 (in a § 504 case, holding that it was proper for the trial
court to decline to instruct the jury that good faith efforts to provide reasonable accommodation
constituted a defense to damages, since § 504 does not incorporate the 1981 a limitation).
IlI. See, e.g., Duvall v. County of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124, 1138 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding that a
plaintiff must demonstrate "deliberate indifference" to his § 504 rights in order to be awarded damages
under the Act); Garcia v. S.U.N.Y. Health Scis. Ctr. of Brooklyn, 280 F.3d 98, 115 (2d Cir. 2001)
(same).
112. Id.
113. Duvall, 260 F.3dat 1139.
114. Cf. 42 U.S.C. 1981a (stating that damages may be awarded for disparate treatment and for
failure to engage in good faith efforts to provide reasonable accommodations); Duvall, 260 F.3d at
1138-40 (discussing the § 504 standard for an award of damages, in terms that make clear that disparate
treatment and a failure to engage in reasonable efforts to provide reasonable accommodations will
suffice to meet the standard). It may be, however, that there will be occasional circumstances in which a
damage award might be permissible under one, but not the other of the Acts. For example, where an
employer was aware of a policy or procedure having a disparate impact on the disabled but failed to
categorically modify it to be in accordance with the Acts, such action might entitle a § 504 plaintiff to an
award of damages in certain circumstances where a Title I plaintiff would not be entitled to relief. See
generally Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory, 381 F.3d 56, 77 (2d Cir. 2004) (in an ADEA
case, holding that a jury verdict finding no disparate treatment, but finding both willfulness and a
disparate impact, was not internally inconsistent).
115. S. REP. No. 102-357, at 71 (1992), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3712, 3782.
116. See, e.g., Oliveras-Sifre v. P.R. Dep't of Health, 214 F.3d 23, 25 n.2 (1st Cir. 2000) (analyzing
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a few opinions suggesting that courts may not construe the 1992 amendments
as eliminating all differences in the proper interpretation of what constitutes a
substantive violation of the Acts.117 The primary area in which courts have
continued to distinguish between the Acts is discussed below, together with the
reasons why further differences between the Acts seem relatively unlikely to
emerge.
(a) The Causation Quandary and the Meaning of the 1992 Amendments
Aside from the requirement of federal funding, the most obvious difference
between the text of § 504 and Title I is in the standards of causation apparently
required by the Acts. Section 504 provides that "[n]o otherwise qualified
individual.., shall, solely by reason of her or his disability... be subjected to
discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance." 118 In contrast, Title I's core provision provides that, "[n]o covered
entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability because
of the disability of such individual. . . ." 119 In accordance with this statutory
distinction, some courts have, subsequent to the 1992 amendments, continued
to list the showing required under the Rehabilitation Act as that of
demonstrating that discrimination occurred "solely" 120 by reason of
disability.121
If the courts' treatment of the "solely" requirement were limited simply to
continuing to list it in summarizing the elements required in § 504 employment
claims, it could be interpreted as a perhaps unfortunate, but not terribly
Title I and § 504 claims together as per § 794(d)); Cash v. Smith, 231 F.3d 1301, 1305 (1 lth Cir. 2000)
(same); Myers v. Hose, 50 F.3d 278, 281 (4th Cir. 1995) (same). See also Peters v. Baldwin Union Free
Sch. Dist., 320 F.3d 164, 168 n.2 (2d Cir. 2003) (applying Title I case law to a § 504 claim as per
§ 794(d)); Breen v. Dep't of Transp., 282 F.3d 839, 841 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (applying Title I statutory
provisions to a § 504 claim as per § 794(d)).
117. See, e.g., Soledad v. U.S. Dep't of Treasury, 304 F.3d 500, 503-05 (5th Cir. 2002) (concluding
that different standards of causation apply to employment claims under the Rehabilitation Act and Title
I).
118. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (emphasis added).
119. 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (emphasis added).
120. See, e.g., Soledad, 304 F.3d at 503-05; Keene v. Thompson, 232 F.Supp.2d 574, 583
(M.D.N.C. 2002). But see Powell v. City of Pittsfield, 221 F.Supp.2d 119, 148-50 (D. Mass. 2002)
(discussing at length why 1992 amendments require substitution of ADA standard of causation for
"solely" requirement in § 504 employment discrimination claims); Phelps v. Optima Health, Inc., 251
F.3d 21, 23 n.2 (1st Cir. 2001) (determining that § 504 claims should be analyzed under identical
standards as Title I claims, and thus only listing Title I's elements in analyzing the plaintiff's claims).
121. Strangely, some courts have also imported the "solely" requirement into their listing of
elements under the ADA, thereby rendering the statutes coextensive. See, e.g., Brohm v. J.H. Properties,
Inc., 149 F.3d 517, 520-22 (6th Cir. 1998); Deppe v. United Airlines, 217 F.3d 1262, 1265 (9th Cir.
2000). This approach has been followed by only a small minority of courts and seems unfaithful both to
the text and legislative history of the ADA. See Johnson v. Trs. of Durham Technical Community
College, 535 S.E.2d 357, 365-66 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000) (collecting cases). See also McNely v. Ocala
Star-Banner Corp., 99 F.3d 1068, 1073-77 (11th Cir. 1996) (discussing legislative history and text of the
ADA and rejecting claims that it incorporates the Rehabilitation Act's standard of causation). As a
result, this approach seems highly unlikely to ultimately emerge as the prevailing view on this issue.
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troubling, artifact of the history of § 504. What is far more concerning for §
504 employment plaintiffs is that some courts have taken the subsequent step of
applying this distinction in analysis to find qualitative differences in the
standards to be applied to employment claims brought under the respective
acts. 122
Although very few courts have engaged in this type of more extended
analysis, where they have, it has generally resulted in adverse outcomes for the
standards used to evaluate § 504 employment claims. 123 In particular, the few
courts to have considered the question directly have generally found that §
504's textual "solely" requirement means that § 504 employment plaintiffs
must establish that their disability was not just a motivating factor for the
employer's actions, but rather that it was a but-for cause of such actions. 124 As
a result, they have found that the Price Waterhouse mixed-motive formulation
does not apply to § 504 employment claims. 125
The Price Waterhouse mixed-motive formulation was a burden-shifting test
developed in the context of Title VII case law that was subsequently codified in
the text of the CRA. 126 While it remains unsettled whether the case law or
codified version of the test applies to Title I claims, 27 the mixed-motive
formulation is generally acknowledged to apply in some form to ADA
employment discrimination claims.1 28 As a result, Title I plaintiffs are entitled
to have the burden of proof shifted to the employer where, in a disparate
treatment case, they have demonstrated via direct evidence (e.g., statements)1
29
122. See, e.g., Soledad, 304 F.3d at 505; Justus v. Clinch Indep. Living Serv., 2001 WL 848592, at
*6 n.8 (W.D. Va. 2001). Cf Hendler v. Intelecom USA, 963 F. Supp. 200, 204 n.1 (E.D.N.Y. 1997)
(stating in dicta that Rehabilitation Act plaintiffs must prove that they were discriminated against
"solely" on the basis of disability, whereas ADA plaintiffs can employ a mixed-motive formulation). But
cf Powell v. City of Pittsfield, 221 F. Supp. 2d 119, 148-150 (D. Mass. 2002) (discussing at length why
1992 amendments require substitution of ADA standard of causation for "solely" requirement in § 504
employment discrimination claims).
123. See, e.g., Soledad, 304 F.3d at 505; Justus v. Clinch Indep. Living Serv., 2001 WL 848592, at
*6 n.8 (W.D. Va. 2001). Cf Hendler v. Intelecom USA, 963 F. Supp. 200, 204 n.1 (E.D.N.Y. 1997)
(stating in dicta that Rehabilitation Act plaintiffs must prove that they were discriminated against
"solely" on the basis of disability, whereas ADA plaintiffs can employ a mixed-motive formulation).
124. See, e.g., Soledad, 304 F.3d at 505.
125. Id. The Fifth Circuit is the only circuit to have explicitly held that the Price Waterhouse
formulation is not applicable to § 504 employment discrimination claims. See Soledad, 304 F.3d at 505.
126. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 252-55 (1989); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m); 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B).
127. See, e.g., Patten v. Wal-Mart Stores East, Inc., 300 F.3d 21, 25 n.2 (1st Cir. 2002).
128. See, e.g., Parker v. Columbia Pictures Industries, 204 F.3d 326, 336-37 (2d Cir. 2000);
McNely v. Ocala Star-Banner Corp., 99 F.3d 1068, 1075-76 (1 1th Cir. 1996). See generally Johnson v.
Trs. of Durham Technical Cmty. Coll., 535 S.E.2d 357, 365-66 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000) (collecting cases
holding that an ADA plaintiff needs to demonstrate only that disability was a "motivating factor" for the
adverse employment action).
129. It may be also that a strong circumstantial case can be adequate to allow resort to the Price
Waterhouse formulation, but this issue is unsettled in the courts. See, e.g., Patten, 300 F.3d at 25 n.1.
This uncertainty was in part a carry-over from the state of Title VII law, where the issue was similarly
unresolved until very recently. In Price Waterhouse the main opinion carried only a plurality of the
Court's members. There were two opinions concurring in the judgment, one of which would have
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that their disability was a motivating factor in the employer's decision to take
an adverse employment action.130 In the event that the statutory version of the
Price Waterhouse test is ultimately found to be applicable to Title I, ADA
plaintiffs would also be entitled to attorney's fees and limited injunctive relief
even if the employer succeeded in demonstrating that they would have taken
the same action in the absence of discrimination.1 31
Although clearly, in certain instances, the availability of this test may be
dispositive of the outcome of a plaintiffs claim, there are several reasons why
its unavailability may not be significant in most § 504 employment
discrimination claims. As an initial matter, many, if not most, disability
discrimination claims hinge on the employer's failure to provide reasonable
accommodations, 132 where the employee's disability is an acknowledged, and
not illegitimate factor in the employer's decisionmaking process.1 33 Even where
required the demonstration of "direct evidence" in order for a plaintiff to be entitled to the application of
a mixed-motive standard. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 276 (1989) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring). Because one or both of these concurrences were required in order to make a majority, direct
evidence was arguably a prerequisite for application of the mixed-motive formulation. The Supreme
Court has recently clarified that the mixed-motive test as codified modifies this result, allowing resort to
a mixed-motive formulation even where there is no direct evidence of the defendant's motive. See
Desert Palace Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 101-02 (2003). Therefore, whether or not circumstantial
evidence will suffice to secure a mixed-motive test in the ADA context will likely depend on whether or
not the courts ultimately find the statutory or case law version of the Title VII test to be controlling.
130. See, e.g., Parker, 204 F.3d at 336-38; Patten, 300 F.3d at 25. See generally Johnson, 535
S.E.2d at 365-66 (collecting cases).
131. See, e.g., Thomas v. Contoocook Valley Sch. Dist., 150 F.3d 31, 41 n.6 (1st Cir. 1998). See
generally 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (providing that a Title VII plaintiff
who has demonstrated that their protected class status was a motivating factor in the employer's decision
is entitled to recover attorney's fees and limited injunctive relief even where the employer demonstrates
that they would have taken the same action, even in the absence of discrimination).
132. Unlike many other federal discrimination statutes, there are multiple different types of claims
that can be brought under the disability discrimination statutes. The three predominant forms of claims
that can be brought pursuant to the ADA and § 504 are disparate treatment claims, reasonable
accommodations claims, and disparate impact claims (although the extent to which a robust disparate
impact cause of action exists under the disability discrimination statutes remains in doubt, see infra note
168). In addition to these three primary types of claims, numerous regulations provide alternative bases
for raising claims under the Acts. For example, one can challenge the failure to provide services in an
integrated setting (which may, but need not, also constitute disparate treatment); the failure to effectively
communicate with disabled individuals (which may constitute a failure to provide reasonable
accommodations, but which is also subject to more specific regulatory standards); and the failure to
operate a program in a fashion which is accessible when viewed as a whole (which may, but need not,
constitute a failure to provide reasonable accommodations).
133. Although not all courts have specified that the mixed motive test is not applicable to
reasonable accommodations claims, as a logical matter it is very difficult to envision how it might apply.
By definition, in order for a plaintiff to be raising a reasonable accommodations claim, the employer
must have admitted or been shown to have relied in some way on the disability in taking the adverse
employment action. It is clear that plaintiffs are not, however, thereby relieved of any burden of
demonstrating that there are possible reasonable accommodations that would have allowed them to
perform the job, even under the ADA. See, e.g., US Airways v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 401-02 (2002). It
is, furthermore, clear that a demonstration of but-for causation in the sense of the disability playing a
dispositive role in the adverse employment action is not, in and of itself, adequate to establish liability in
a reasonable accommodation claim, unlike in a disparate treatment claim. On the contrary, if there are
no "reasonable" accommodations that would allow the plaintiff to perform the job, it is perfectly
legitimate for the employer to rely on the disability in taking adverse employment actions. Applying the
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the question is one of disparate treatment, thereby potentially making the test
applicable, the employee may lack the necessary direct evidence (or strong
circumstantial case) that is a necessary prerequisite to the imposition of the
Price Waterhouse burden-shifting framework. 134 Indeed, in many of the § 504
cases that have been dismissed on causation grounds, the courts have found that
the plaintiff did not demonstrate that their disability was even a motivating
factor in the employer's decision making process.'
35
There are also substantial arguments that these interpretations of the
causation standard applicable under § 504 are simply erroneous in light of the
1992 amendments.' 36 The text of § 794(d) seems to plainly mandate that all
substantive Title I standards be used in evaluating § 504 employment
discrimination claims. 137 Furthermore, the application of different standards of
causation appears to undermine the core intent of the 1992 amendments,
namely to ensure that employers are subject to consistent substantive
requirements under the Acts. 138 Given that relatively few courts have, as of yet,
fully considered the question of the causation standard to be applied in § 504
employment claims, it seems plausible that the weight of judicial opinion could
ultimately cut against the stance taken by the few courts to have considered the
question to date.
Price Waterhouse framework to the reasonable accommodations context therefore becomes a
nonsensical endeavor. Some courts have explicitly stated that the question of whether the discrimination
was "solely" by reason of disability is not the correct question in reasonable accommodations cases. See,
e.g., Peebles v. Potter, 354 F.3d 761, 767 n.5 (8th Cir. 2004); Vinson v. Thomas, 288 F.3d 1145, 1154
n.9 (9th Cir. 2002). Instead, such cases address the causation element by looking at whether the
employee could have been accommodated reasonably without undue burden. See e.g., Peebles, 354 F.3d
at 767 n.5 & 768.Where such accommodation could have been achieved, causation is established for the
purposes of the Acts. See, e.g., id.
134. See, e.g., Dratz v. Johnson, 60 F.3d 837, *3 (10th Cir. 1995) (unpublished) (finding, in a § 504
case, that "[t]he evidence ... failed to create a material issue of fact as to whether the challenged
decisions were even motivated in part by handicap discrimination...."); Bums v. City of Columbus, 91
F.3d 836, 843 (6th Cir. 1996) (same).
135. See, e.g., Dratz, 60 F.3d at *3; Burns, 91 F.3d at 843. Cf. Lussier v. Runyon, 1994 WL
129776, at *10 (D. Me. 1994) (not reaching the question of whether the mixed motive formulation
would apply in a § 791 case, because it was clear that disability was a but-for cause of the termination).
This assessment, however, may be skewed by the fact that most discussions of this issue occur in the
context of decisions on summary judgment or on a motion to dismiss. A jury instruction that
discrimination must be "solely because of disability," rather than just a "motivating factor" may well
play a role in the outcome of cases in certain instances. Cf Soledad v. United States Dep't of Treasury,
304 F.3d 500, 505 (5th Cir. 2002) (finding that it was error for the judge to instruct the jury that the
Plaintiff could prevail upon a showing that his disability was a "motivating factor" in the defendant's
adverse employment action, but declining to issue judgment for the employer, since a reasonable jury
could find that the plaintiff's disability was the sole cause of that action).
136. For an interesting argument on why, irrespective of the 1992 amendments, the clear rejection
of the extreme version of the "solely" requirement in the ADA's legislative history should be treated as
persuasive by courts in adjudicating § 504 claims see Mark Weber, Disability Discrimination by State
and Local Government: The Relationship Between Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and Title 11 of
the Americans with Disabilities Act, 36 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1089, 1111 (1995). See also Powell v.
City of Pittsfield, 221 F. Supp. 2d 119, 148-49 (D. Mass. 2002) (expressing a similar view).
137. See 29 U.S.C. § 794(d) (2000).
138. See S. REP. No. 102-357, at 71 (1992), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3712, 3782.
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(b) Impact of the 1992 Amendments Outside of the Causation Context
Fortunately, the courts have not, as of yet, extended their differential
treatment of Title I and § 504 to other aspects of the Acts' substantive
standards. However, Title I and § 504 (and their implementing regulations)
have many other textual differences.1 39 These differences could, potentially, be
seized upon by the courts as a basis for treating differently the substance of
what constitutes a violation of the Acts. As discussed below, the courts seem,
for a number of reasons, unlikely to adopt this type of approach. This
prediction is borne out by the limited case law to address the relevance of the
1992 amendments for textual differences other than the Acts' "solely / because
of' distinction. 1
40
The first, and most compelling, reason why the courts seem unlikely to
engage in extensive parsing of the texts of Title I, § 504, and their respective
regulations, is obviously the language and intent of the 1992 amendments.14'
Unless the courts are willing to completely disregard the intended import of
those amendments, they cannot engage in a detailed comparison of what
constitutes a substantive violation of the Acts. Indeed, any judicial attempts to
draw text-based distinctions between what constitutes a violation of Title I and
§ 504 seems precisely contradictory to the expressed intent of Congress in the
1992 amendments. 42 As noted above, this has not deterred some courts from
differentiating between the causation standards required under the Acts.
However, even if one does not contest the validity of those decisions, they need
not be applied outside of the causation context.
The basis for the courts' decisions in the causation context, i.e., the "solely /
because of' distinction between the statutes, is the only significant distinction
(aside from federal funding) contained in the core statutory text of § 504.141
139. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117 (2000) (Title I); 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2000) (§ 504); 29 C.F.R. §§
1630.1-1630.16 (2004) (Title I regulations); 28 C.F.R., Ch. I, Pt. 41 (2004) (§ 504 Department of Justice
coordination regulations). There are a number of other sets of regulations that are applicable to
employment discrimination claims under the Rehabilitation Act in certain instances. In addition, there
are hundreds of pages of regulatory guidance documents and interpretative regulations that apply to Title
I and/or § 504.
140. See, e.g., Woodman v. Runyon, 132 F.3d 1330, 1339-41 (10th Cir. 1997) (holding that the
1992 amendments mandated a change in pre-1992 interpretations of § 504); Shiring v. Runyon, 90 F.3d
827, 831-32 (3rd Cir. 1996) (same). See also Oliveras-Sifre v. Puerto Rico Dep't of Health, 214 F.3d 23,
25 n.2 (1st Cir. 2000) (analyzing Title I and § 504 claims together as per § 794(d)); Cash v. Smith, 231
F.3d 1301, 1305 (11 th Cir. 2000) (same).
141. See 29 U.S.C. § 794(d); S. REP. No. 102-357 (1992), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3712,
3782.
142. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 102-357 (1992), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3712, 3782 (stating
that the specific incorporation of Title I standards was intended to "ensure uniformity and consistency of
interpretations" by courts evaluating disability employment discrimination claims).
143. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (indicating that "[n]o covered entity shall discriminate against
a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability"); with 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (indicating
that "[n]o otherwise qualified individual with a disability....shall, solely by reason of her or his
disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance"). The core anti-
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Because it is included in § 504's core text, one arguably would have to
judicially rewrite the language of § 504 in order to render its causation standard
consistent with Title I. In contrast, most of the other potential distinctions
between § 504 and Title I arise from differences between Title I's text and §
504's case law or regulations. Thus, construing § 504 consistently with Title I
in those areas would not require disregarding significant aspects of § 504's
statutory text.
It seems likely, as a result, that courts might be less reluctant to give the
1992 Amendments their full import outside of the causation context. And
indeed, in those circumstances where courts have been called upon to evaluate
the non-causation implications of the 1992 Amendments, they have found the
Amendments to mandate consistent interpretation of the Acts.' 44 A prominent
example of this is in the reasonable accommodation context.
Prior to the passage of the ADA, reassignment to another position was
generally not considered a "reasonable" accommodation under § 504.145 Title I,
in contrast, explicitly provides that "[t]he term 'reasonable accommodation'
may include ... reassignment to a vacant position .... Subsequent to the
passage of the 1992 amendments, the courts have found Title I's statement of
what is reasonable to be controlling in § 504 employment cases.' 47 As a result,
they have found, contrary to prior interpretations of § 504, that Rehabilitation
Act plaintiffs may be entitled to reassignment as a reasonable
accommodation.
148
It thus seems likely that § 504 employment discrimination plaintiffs will be
subject to evaluation of their claims under standards that are very similar to
those applied to Title I plaintiffs. As noted, the courts at present treat Title I and
§ 504 employment claims as largely coextensive. In light of the specific
discrimination provision of Title I also delineates specific employment related practices that are covered,
see 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b), whereas § 504 includes more general prohibitions on exclusion from and
denial of benefits of programs, see 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). These differences seem unlikely to prove
significant however, as it is well-established that § 504 provides a cause of action for employment
discrimination, see, e.g., Consol. Rail Corp. v. Darrone, 465 U.S. 624, 631-34 (1984), and most of the
specific employment related practices prohibited in Title I's statutory text were drawn from § 504
regulations. Cf 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b) (setting out specific forms of discrimination prohibited by Title I);
28 C.F.R., Ch. I, Pt. 41 (prohibiting many of the same practices under § 504); see also Rosalie K.
Murphy, Reasonable Accommodation and Employment Discrimination Under Title I of the Americans
with Disabilities Act, S. CAL. L. REv. 1607, 1608 (1991) (noting that many of the provisions of Title I
were drawn from § 504's implementing regulations).
144. See, e.g., Woodman, 132 F.3d at 1339-41; Shiring, 90 F.3d at 831-32.
145. See, e.g., Woodman, 132 F.3d at 1339 n.9. See also Barbara A. Lee, Reasonable
Accommodation Under the Americans with Disabilities Act: The Limitations of Rehabilitation Act
Precedent, 14 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 201, 206 (1993) (noting that "the ADA includes
reassignment as a potential accommodation" and that "[i]n contrast, the federal Rehabilitation Act (and
its implementing regulations) ... do not include reassignment, and many judges, prior to the ADA's
passage, ruled that reassignment to a different position [wa]s not required by [the] law.")
146. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9) (2000).
147. See, e.g., Woodman, 132 F.3d at 1339-41; Shiring, 90 F.3d at 831-32.
148. See, e.g., Woodman, 132 F.3d at 1339-41; Shiring, 90 F.3d at 831-32.
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mandate of the 1992 amendments, it seems very likely that they will continue
to do so into the future. Although a few courts' treatment of the "solely /
because of' distinction between the Acts raises some concerns, it seems likely
to prove to be an aberrant example of the courts' treatment of the two statutes,
at least in the area of employment discrimination claims.
C. Government Programs, Services, and Benefits: Title II of the ADA and §
504
Congress did not, in amending § 504 in 1992, impose a blanket mandate
requiring the application of Title II standards to § 504 or vice versa. There are
however, a number of provisions that require some form of consistent
interpretation of the two Acts, even in the government programs and services
area. Most notably, Title II provides (and has provided since its enactment) that
except for certain exceptions mandated by statute, all regulations promulgated
pursuant to Title II, "shall be consistent with the coordination regulations" of
the Rehabilitation Act. 149 Given that Title II as enacted included, like § 504,
only a very minimal core anti-discrimination provision 50 (which itself is
virtually identical to § 504), 15 this requirement of consistent regulations has
had the effect of compelling consistent treatment of the Acts in most
circumstances.1 52 Furthermore, all interpretations of Title II are, like Title I,
also subject to Title V's requirement that "[e]xcept as otherwise provided [by
statute], nothing in this chapter shall be construed to apply a lesser standard
than the standards applied under title V of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 ... or
the regulations issued by Federal agencies pursuant to such title.,
153
As a result, the two Acts have been in most circumstances treated as
identical by reviewing courts. 154 There are, however, a few circumstances in
149. 42 U.S.C. § 12134 (2000).
150. Title It also includes fairly extensive provisions governing public transportation systems. See
42 U.S.C. §§ 12141-12150 (2000). These provisions, however, are also explicitly applicable to § 504,
and therefore do not provide any basis for differential interpretation of the Acts. Id.
151. See Burgdorf, supra note 2, at 445 (noting that "[t]he language of [Title 11] appears to be the
most completely tied into the wording of section 504"). Compare Title H1, 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2000)
("[N]o qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from
participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be
subjected to discrimination by any such entity."), with § 504, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2000) ("No otherwise
qualified individual with a disability ... shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from
the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or
activity receiving Federal financial assistance ... ").
152. See, e.g., Helen L. v. DiDario, 46 F.3d 325, 332 (3d Cir. 1995) (noting that all regulations
promulgated under Title II are to modeled on the Rehabilitation Act's regulations); see also Burgdorf,
supra note 2, at 444-45 (noting that "[T]itle II of the [ADA] was largely an attempt to apply the
prohibition against discrimination ... set out in the section 504 regulations to all programs, activities,
and services of state and local governments"). Compare 28 C.F.R. § 35 (2004) (Department of Justice
Title II regulations), with 28 C.F.R. § 41 (2004) (Department of Justice § 504 coordination regulations).
153. 42 U.S.C. § 12201 (2000).
154. See, e.g., MX Group, Inc. v. City of Covington, 293 F.3d 326, 332 (6th Cit. 2002) (noting that
§ 504 and Title II are generally coextensive, and discussing claims together); Davis v. University of
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which the Acts have been or could be differentiated on the basis of their
statutory or regulatory texts. Below, these circumstances are discussed, and
their implications for § 504 plaintiffs are explored.
i. Entities That Can Sue and Be Sued Under Title II and § 504
Like Title I, Title II defines the class of individuals who can bring suit
identically to § 504.155 There is therefore, no difference in who may sue under
one or the other of the respective acts. Different entities will sometimes be
subject to suit under § 504 and Title II, because of § 504's federal funding
requirement. However, both Title II and § 504 otherwise apply to all public
entities. As a result, in the absence of a federal funding issue, all public entities
are subject to suit under both Title II and § 504.
ii. Procedural and Remedial Measures Applicable to Title II and § 504
Title II is also not distinct from § 504 in the procedural and remedial
mechanisms that it adopts. Title II in fact specifically co-opts § 504's
procedural and remedial scheme, providing that "[t]he remedies, procedures
and rights set forth in 794a of Title 29 shall be the remedies, procedures and
rights this subchapter provides to any person alleging discrimination on the
1156basis of disability .... , As a result, Title II and § 504 plaintiffs will be faced
with identical procedural and remedial frameworks in pursuing government
programs and services claims.
North Carolina, 263 F.3d 95, 99 (4th Cir. 2001) (same); Cercpac v. Health and Hospitals Corporation,
147 F.3d 165, 167 (2nd Cir. 1998) (same).
155. See 29 U.S.C. § 705(20)(B) (Rehabilitation Act) (stating that "'individual with a disability'
means ... any person who (i) has a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or
more of such person's major life activities, (ii) has a record of such impairment, or (iii) is regarded as
having such an impairment"); 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2000) (Title II) (indicating that "no qualified
individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, [be subjected to discrimination]")
(emphasis added); 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2000) (Rehabilitation Act) (indicating that "[n]o otherwise qualified
individual with a disability . . . shall, solely by reason of her or his disability [be subjected to
discrimination]") (emphasis added); see also 42 U.S.C. § 12131 (2000) (Title II) (stating that "[t]he term
'qualified individual with a disability' means an individual with a disability who, with or without
reasonable modifications to rules, policies, or practices . . . meets the essential eligibility requirements
for the receipt of services"); 28 C.F.R. § 39.103 (2004) (Rehabilitation Act) (stating that "'[q]ualified
handicapped person' means ... a handicapped person who meets the essential eligibility requirements
for participation in, or receipt of benefits from, [a] program or activity"); 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (2000)
(ADA general provisions) (indicating that "[t]he term 'disability' means ... (1) A physical or mental
impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of [an] ... individual; (B) a
record of such impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment"); Alexander v. Choate,
469 U.S. 287, 299 n.19 & 300 (1985) (indicating that program eligibility criteria must be adjusted under
the Rehabilitation Act where necessary to provide reasonable accommodations to individuals with
disabilities).
156. 42 U.S.C. § 12133.
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iii. Differences in the Substantive Standards Applied to Assess Violations
of Title II and § 504
Unlike Title I and § 504, Title II and § 504 are not subject to any
overarching mandate of substantive consistency. As a result, to the extent that
there are salient textual differences in the substantive standards set out by the
Acts and their regulations, one would expect the courts to differentiate between
the Acts. There are several such potential bases for differentiation. Most
significantly, the statutory text of Title II, like Title I, appears to incorporate a
different standard of causation than is articulated in the statutory text of § 504.
There are, in addition, several textual distinctions between the regulations
promulgated under Title II and § 504. Finally, there is at least one area where
defendants have urged differential interpretation of the Acts, despite the
existence of textually identical implementing regulations. Each of these
potential bases for differentiating between the Acts is discussed in turn below.
(a) Distinctions in the Statutory Text of § 504 and Title II: The "Solely"
Conundrum in the Context of Government Programs and Services
The only significant substantive' 57 distinction between § 504 and Title II's
statutory texts is in their articulation of the applicable standard of causation.
Section 504 provides that "[n]o otherwise qualified individual ... shall, solely
by reason of her or his disability... be subjected to discrimination under any
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance .... ,,58 Similarly to
Title I, Title II annunciates what appears to be a different standard of causation,
requiring only that claimants demonstrate that they were "subjected to
discrimination" "by reason of... disability."'59 Some courts have accordingly
found that the causation standards of the two statutes must be construed
differently. 1
60
As in the case of Title I, the primary context in which this distinction has
been addressed is in evaluating the availability of a motivating factor or mixed-
motive formulation.' 6' Although few courts have directly addressed the issue,
157. There are several other non-substantive differences between § 504 and Title II's texts,
including, most notably, § 504's federal funding requirement. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (Title I1);
with 29 U.S.C. § 794 (§ 504).
158. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (emphasis added).
159. 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (emphasis added).
160. See, e.g., Reg'l Econ. Cmty. Action Program (RECAP) v. City of Middletown, 294 F.3d 35,
49 (2d Cir. 2002); Betts v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 198 F. Supp. 2d 787, 798 (W.D. Va.
2002). But cf Innovative Health Sys., Inc. v. City of White Plains, 931 F. Supp. 222, 241 (S.D.N.Y.
1996) (stating that plaintiffs in both Title II and § 504 cases need only demonstrate that disability was a
"motivating factor" in the defendants' actions). As in the case of Title I, there are also a few courts that
have inexplicably imported the "sole" causation requirement into their statement of Title 1l's
requirements. See, e.g., Sandinson v. Mich. High Sch. Athletic Assoc., 64 F.3d 1026, 1036 (6th Cir.
1995); Rhodes v. Ohio High Sch. Athletic Ass., 939 F. Supp. 584, 592 (N.D. Ohio 1996). For a
discussion of why this approach seems unlikely to be durable, see note 121, supra.
161. See RECAP, 294 F.3d at 49; Betts, 198 F. Supp. 2d at 798. Cf Burgdorf, supra note 2, at 430
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those that have have generally found that Title II requires only a showing that
disability was "a motivating factor," whereas § 504 requires a showing of but-
for causation. 162 As in the employment discrimination arena, however, it is
difficult to evaluate to what extent this affects § 504 plaintiffs' prospects for
success. In general, relatively few government services or programs claims are
premised on a disparate treatment cause of action.' 63 Where they are, and where
the liability issue turns on causation, there is often either substantial evidence
that would support a finding of but-for cause, 164 or else there is virtually no
evidence supporting such a finding.' 65 It appears to be quite rare that there is in
fact sufficient evidence to support the Price Waterhouse burden-shifting
paradigm, but insufficient evidence to support an inference of but-for
causation. 166 As a result, it is not at all clear to what extent the courts' finding
of different standards of causation in fact disadvantages § 504 plaintiffs.167
It is even more difficult to discern what potential impact the "solely / by
reason of' distinction might have outside of the burden-shifting context. Given
the complicated causation structure of the disability discrimination statutes,
n.93 (comparing § 504's requirement of "sole" causation with the Title II standard, and with the Price
Waterhouse mixed-motive standard). But cf Mark C. Weber, Disability Discrimination by State and
Local Government: The Relationship Between Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and Title H of the
Americans with Disabilities Act, 36 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1089, 1110-12 (1995) (arguing that the
"solely" causation requirement should be read out of § 504, and that § 504 should be read identically to
Title 11).
162. See RECAP, 294 F.3d at 49; Betts, 198 F. Supp. 2d at 798.
163. As in the case of employment discrimination claims, many government programs and services
claims focus on a failure to provide reasonable accommodations. See note 132 and accompanying text,
supra. In addition, many government programs and services claimants raise more specialized
regulation-based claims, such as failure to effectively communicate, and failure to provide services in an
integrated setting. See notes 170-211, infra, and accompanying text.
164. See, e.g., RECAP, 294 F.3d at 49, 52 (noting difference between Title II and § 504 standards
but finding that the Plaintiff's allegations were adequate to survive summary judgment under either
standard of causation). Cf. MX Group v. City of Covington, 293 F.3d 326, 329-32 (6th Cir. 2002)
(treating Title 11 and § 504 claims as coextensive, on facts that would satisfy either standard of
causation); Baird ex rel. Baird v. Rose, 192 F.3d 462, 465-66, 469 (4th Cir. 1999) (finding that, because
Title II does not require "sole" causation, Price Waterhouse formulation applied, but the facts alleged
would have supported even higher standard of but-for causation).
165. See, e.g., Betts, 198 F. Supp. 2d at 798 (noting the difference between the § 504 and Title II
standards, and finding that the Plaintiff could not demonstrate that perceived disability was even a
motivating factor in his discharge); David B. v. McDonald, 1998 WL 111705, at *3-4 & n.4 (N.D. Ill.
Mar. 12, 1998) (stating in dicta that Plaintiffs might have more viable claims under Title II, but in fact
finding that disability was not even a motivating factor in the denial of services), vacated on unrelated
grounds, 156 F.3d 780 (7th Cir. 1998).
166. Although no court has directly addressed the question of the applicability of the Price
Waterhouse test to § 504 government programs and services claims, it would be unavailable where the
courts have found that § 504 requires a showing that disability discrimination was more than a
"motivating factor." Cf. Baird, 192 F.3d at 469-70 (finding that Price Waterhouse formulation was
applicable to Title II and distinguishing Title If from § 504 in that regard).
167. As in the case of Title I, surveying published rulings, which tend to address decisions on a
motion for summary judgment or motion to dismiss, probably underestimates the potential impact of the
different causation standards. The differing jury instructions that result from the different standards of
causation under the two Acts probably do adversely impact the outcome of § 504 claims in some
instances. See supra note 135.
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particularly in the area of government programs and services, there are
numerous areas in which the "solely / by reason of' distinction between Title II
and § 504 could potentially be significant. In particular, some of the restrictive
readings that were given to § 504 prior to the passage of the ADA were
arguably contingent on an understanding of § 504's standard of causation, and
thus potentially distinguishable on the basis of Title II's distinctive language.168
In practice, however, courts have declined to find the distinction to be
meaningful, incorporating prior restrictive readings of § 504 into their
interpretation of Title II. 69 As a result, government programs and services
plaintiffs seem unlikely to face a significantly worse causation standard as a
result of § 504's "solely" requirement. Although the inability to utilize the
Price Waterhouse standard may, in certain instances, disadvantage plaintiffs
pursuing disparate treatment claims, it appears in most cases that the causation
standards under Title II and § 504 will be treated by the courts as identical.
168. The most obvious area in which Title II might have been construed more broadly than § 504 is
in the availability of disparate impact actions. Under pre-ADA case law, courts had found that
government policies having a disparate impact on the disabled were actionable under § 504, but only
inasmuch as the program denied "meaningful access" to the disabled. See Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S.
287, 301-02 (1985). Arguably, the exclusion of the word "solely" from the ADA's statutory text could
have been read to incorporate a broader disparate impact mandate. As courts have noted, the omission of
the "solely" requirement from the ADA renders the statute's causation language more akin to that of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act than that of § 504. See, e.g., Baird ex rel. Baird v. Rose, 192 F.3d 462,
470 (4th Cir. 1999); McNely v. Ocala Star-Banner Corp. 99 F.3d 1068, 1075-76 (1 1th Cir. 1996). See
generally 29 U.S.C. 794 (2004) (Rehabilitation Act) (prohibiting discrimination "solely by reason of'
disability); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2004) (Title VII of the CRA) (prohibiting discrimination "because of'
race, color, religion, sex or national origin); 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2004) (Title II of the ADA) (prohibiting
discrimination "by reason of' disability). Given that Title VII has long been recognized to have a robust
disparate impact requirement, not limited by any conception of "meaningful access," this distinction
could potentially have provided the basis for reading a broader disparate impact cause of action into
Title II than exists under § 504. See generally Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 989-
91 (1988) (holding, in the Title VII context, that subjective or discretionary employment practices can
be challenged via disparate impact claims); Conn. v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 451 (1982) (holding, in the
Title VII context, that "bottom line" results in which minority applicants are proportionally represented
does not constitute a defense to an intermediate evaluation practice having a racially disparate impact).
Courts have, however, generally not made this type of distinction, finding that Title II is violated only
where disabled individuals are denied "meaningful access" to the challenged program. See, e.g., Wright
v. Giuliani, 230 F.3d 543, 547-48 (2nd Cir. 2000); Theriault v. Flynn, 162 F.3d 46, 48 (1st Cir. 1998).
Cf Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581, 619 (1999) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing in a Title II case that
Alexander v. Choate should have compelled a different result if it had been followed by the majority);
Inmates of the Allegheny County Jail v. Wecht, 93 F.3d 1124, at *13 (3rd Cir. 1996) (applying broader
Title VII disparate impact standards to both Title II and § 504 claims), reh 'g en banc granted, 93 F.3d
1146, appeal dismissed as moot, 1996 WL 907824 (1996).
169. See, e.g., Wright, 230 at 547-48 (applying § 504's requirement that a program deny
"meaningful access" to the disabled in order to establish a disparate impact violation in the Title 11
context); Theriault, 162 F.3d at 48; Parker v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 121 F.3d 1006, 1015-19 (6th
Cir. 1997) (applying pre-ADA § 504 case law which had held that discrimination vis-A-vis other
categories of disabled individuals (e.g., exclusion of people with mental disabilities from a generally
applicable disability benefit) was not actionable under the statute in the Title II context); Easley v.
Snyder, 36 F.3d 297, 305-06 (3rd Cir. 1994) (same). But cf Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 619 (1999) (Thomas,
J., dissenting) (arguing that majority had departed from § 504 in interpreting Title II, adopting a more
lenient understanding of comparative discrimination).
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(b) Title II and § 504 Regulations
As noted above, the forms of discrimination prohibited under both Title II
and § 504 are primarily defined by regulation.' 70 As a result, the textual
consistency (or inconsistency) of the regulatory mandates of the two statutes is
at least as critical to their consistent interpretation as the consistency of the
language of the statutes themselves. It is significant therefore that, as per Title
II's statutory mandate, the regulations that have been promulgated to enforce
the ADA in the government programs and services arena are virtually identical
to the § 504 coordination regulations. 171
There are, however, a few significant differences in the text of the
regulations promulgated under the Rehabilitation Act and Title II. 72 As set out
below, § 504 lacks a "reasonable modifications" regulation altogether. There
are, additionally, significant distinctions in the text of § 504 and Title II's
communications and accessibility regulations. Finally, although Title II and §
504 share a textually identical regulation dealing with community integration of
the disabled, defendants have argued for different interpretation of the
integration mandates of the Acts.' 73 The textual differences between the
regulatory mandates of the two statutes, as well as the differences in
interpretation that defendants have urged on the courts, are discussed in turn
below.
(i) The Duty of "Reasonable Modifications" and Affirmative Defenses to
the Duty
The only substantial difference between the Title II and § 504 regulations
that was not specifically authorized by statute is the ADA regulations' specific
requirement that "[a] public entity shall make reasonable modifications in
policies, practices, or procedures when the modifications are necessary to avoid
discrimination on the basis of disability, unless the public entity can
demonstrate that making the modifications would fundamentally alter the
nature of the service, program, or activity.
' ' 74
Although the § 504 coordination regulations include a very similar
regulation in the employment context175 they have no comparable counterpart
in the provisions addressing non-employment programs and services.' 76
This disparity in the respective statutes' regulations, however, is unlikely to
170. See 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2000); 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2000); 28 C.F.R. § 35 (2004); 28 C.F.R. § 41
(2004).
171. Cf 28 C.F.R. § 35 (2004) (Department of Justice Title II regulations); 28 C.F.R. § 41 (2004)
(Department of Justice § 504 coordination regulations).
172. See42 U.S.C. § 12134 (2000).
173. See infra notes 204-211 and accompanying text.
174. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7) (2004).
175. See 28 C.F.R. § 41.53 (2004).
176. See 28 C.F.R. § 41.51 (2004).
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lead to differential interpretations in most instances. 177 The duty to make
reasonable modifications where necessary to avoid discrimination was a
component of the requirements of § 504 that was well established by case law
prior to the passage of the ADA. 178 A defendant was, furthermore, absolved of
this duty under § 504 case law in circumstances where a "fundamental
alteration" of the challenged program or service would result.' 79 Thus, the only
material difference between the Title II regulation and the duty previously
recognized under § 504 case law is that the duty recognized under § 504 was
traditionally further limited to those instances where the modification would
not impose "undue financial or administrative burdens."'
80
Although this difference in the affirmative defenses available to defendants
is not insignificant, under current Supreme Court case law, it in fact constitutes
a relatively limited distinction in the standards to be applied. Because of Title
II's statutory requirement that (with very limited exceptions) Title II
regulations must be consistent with § 504's coordination regulations, the
Supreme Court in the case of Olmstead v. L.C. interpreted the "fundamental
alteration" defense broadly so as to harmonize it with the "undue burden"
standard. 181 As a result, the affirmative defenses available to § 504 defendants
are unlikely to be materially broader than those available to Title II
defendants.' 82 While there is still some possibility that the fundamental
alteration defense will not ultimately be construed to be as broad as the "undue
administrative and financial burdens" defense available under § 504, it is clear
that the Court's decision in Olmstead significantly narrowed the differences
between the two standards.'
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177. In addition to the reasons discussed, infra, it is also interesting that courts sometimes simply
apply 28 C.F.R. § 35.130 in discussing the Rehabilitation Act. See, e.g., Vinson v. Thomas, 288 F.3d
1145, 1154 (9th Cir. 2002).
178. See Sch. Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 287 n.17 (1987); Alexander v. Choate,
469 U.S. 287, 299 n. 19 & 300 (1985). See also Wis. Corr. Serv. v. City of Milwaukee, 173 F. Supp. 2d
842, 849 (E.D. Wis. 2001) (noting that 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7) is consistent with case law
interpretations of § 504).
179. See, e.g., Arline, 480 U.S. at 287 n.17.
180. Id.
181. Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581,606 n.16 (1999).
182. It should be noted that the Court's logic on this point was somewhat questionable. Although
Title II does, as the Court notes, require the promulgation of regulations that are consistent with § 504
regulations, there is no government programs and services regulation on this issue, and accordingly,
nothing for the Title II regulations to be consistent with. The Court compared the Title 11 regulation to
the § 504 employment discrimination regulation, apparently not recognizing that different standards
might be applicable in government programs and services claims than in employment claims. See
Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 606 n.16. In fact, however, there may well be reasons to impose more stringent
requirements on state entities' provision of services and programs to the public than on employers in
their actions vis-A-vis employees.
183. See, e.g., Popovich v. Cuyahoga Court of Common Pleas, 227 F.3d 627, 639 (6th Cir. 2000)
(noting that the Supreme Court's decision in Olmstead apparently made the fundamental alteration
defense less stringent), rev 'd upon reh "g en bancfor diff. reasons, 276 F.3d 808 (6th Cir. 2002); Hahn
ex rel. Barta v. Linn County, 130 F. Supp. 2d 1036, 1045 (N.D. Iowa 2001) (same); Tsombanidis v. City




The second significant distinction between the regulations governing § 504
and those governing Title II of the ADA is in the area of communications. As
mandated by Title II's statutory text, the Title II regulations establishing
requirements for ensuring effective communication with disabled individuals
are modeled on the § 504 regulations applicable to federal programs rather than
the § 504 regulations applicable to federally funded programs. 184 This
distinction is important, as the § 504 regulations governing federal programs set
out communications requirements in considerable more detail and breadth than
the § 504 regulations governing federally funded entities.
In accordance with the regulations they were modeled after, the Title II
regulations governing communication provide that "[a] public entity shall take
appropriate steps to ensure that communications with applicants, participants
and members of the public with disabilities are as effective as communications
with others."' 85 The regulations go on to provide that "[a] public entity shall
furnish appropriate auxiliary aids and services where necessary to afford an
individual with a disability an equal opportunity to participate in, and enjoy the
benefits of, a service, program, or activity conducted by a public entity," and to
set out additional specific requirements designed to ensure effective
communications with disabled individuals.' 86 In contrast, the § 504
coordination regulations provide only that "[r]ecipients shall take appropriate
steps to ensure that communications with their applicants, employees, and
beneficiaries are available to persons with impaired vision and hearing."' 87 As a
result, there arguably should be significant differences in the treatment of
communication-based claims under § 504 and Title II.
Courts, however, have treated claims raised under the two statutes as
virtually identical. Some courts have simply applied ADA standards to
communication-based claims under both Acts, finding them to be equally
applicable to § 504.188 In other cases, the courts have engaged in an
independent analysis of the communication standards applicable to § 504
hardship" constitutes an affirmative defense under Title II).
184. 42U.S.C. § 12134 (2000).
185. 28 C.F.R. § 35.160(a) (2004). See also 28 C.F.R. § 39.160 (2004).
186. 28 C.F.R. § 35.160(b)(1) (2004).
187. 28 C.F.R. § 41.51(e) (2004).
188. See, e.g., Chisolm v. McManimon, 275 F.3d 315, 324 n.9 (3rd Cir. 2001) (applying Title II
communications standards to both ADA and § 504 communications claims); Duvall v. County of Kitsap,
260 F.3d 1124, 1135-36 (9th Cir. 2001) (same); Centerv. City of West Carrollton, 227 F. Supp. 2d 863,
867-70 (S.D. Ohio 2002) (same); McCray v. City of Dothan, 169 F. Supp. 2d 1260, 1273 (M.D. Ala.
2001) (same), af/'d in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 2003 WL 23518420 (11 th Cir. 2003)
(unpublished); Hanson v. Sangamon County Sheriffs Dep't, 991 F. Supp. 1059, 1062 n.2 (C.D. Ill.
1998) (same); Ferguson v. City of Phoenix, 931 F. Supp. 688, 697 (D. Ariz. 1996) (same), affid 157
F.3d 668 (9th Cir. 1998). See also Proctor v. Prince George's Hosp. Ctr., 32 F. Supp. 2d 820, 826-27 (D.
Md. 1998) (relying in part on ADA communications regulations in evaluating § 504 claim).
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claims, but have arrived at the same result as would be achieved under Title
11. 189 Under either method of analysis, courts have generally concluded that the
statutes' mandates in the area of effective communications are coextensive.
This is probably partially the result of the courts' overall tendency to construe
the statutes consistently, but also might be due to a number of more specific
factors.
As an initial matter, while the coordination regulations promulgated under §
504 do not include detailed and comprehensive regulations specific to
communication with disabled individuals, the regulations promulgated by the
Department of Health and Human Services pursuant to the Act do.19° While
these regulations are not technically applicable to all § 504 claims, they were
part of the initial set of regulations promulgated under the Act and have been
afforded substantial deference as a generally applicable interpretation of the
requirements of the Act.' 9 1 As a result, the courts have not infrequently looked
to these regulations in evaluating what is required under the Rehabilitation Act
in terms of effective communication with disabled individuals.' 92
In addition, the non-communication-specific proscriptions of the
Rehabilitation Act are in most instances adequate to raise communication-
based claims that are equivalent to those available under ADA regulations. For
example, in most instances the failure to provide for effective communications
with disabled individuals will unquestionably deny them the benefits of, or
provide them with an unequal opportunity to benefit from, the service, program
or other governmental benefit in question. 193 This clearly violates § 504's
general terms. 194 Similarly, failure to ensure effective communications may
189. See, e.g., Duffy v. Riveland, 98 F.3d 447, 454-56 (9th Cir. 1996); Estate of Alcalde v. Deaton
Specialty Hosp. Home Inc., 133 F. Supp. 2d 702, 707-08 (D. Md. 2001).
190. 45 C.F.R. § 84.52(b)-(d), app. A (2003). Although the HHS regulations are not as
comprehensive as the Title II regulations regarding communications, they are much more
comprehensive than the communications provisions included in the § 504 DOJ coordination regulations.
Compare id.; with 28 C.F.R. § 35.160 (Title II regulation) and 28 C.F.R. § 41.51(e) (§ 504 regulation).
191. See, e.g., Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 631-32 (1998) (noting that the 1977 HEW
regulations are of "particular significance" in interpreting the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act);
Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 304 n.24 (1985) (noting that the Court has frequently recognized the
1977 HEW regulations as "an important source of guidance on the meaning of § 504"); Consol. Rail
Corp. v. Darrone, 465 U.S. 624, 634 (1984) (noting the special status of the 1977 HEW regulations in
interpreting § 504).
192. See, e.g., Alcalde, 133 F. Supp. 2d at 707; Proctor v. Prince George's Hosp. Ctr., 32 F. Supp.
2d 820, 826 (D. Md. 1998).
193. See, e.g., Hahn ex rel. Barta v. Linn County, 130 F. Supp. 2d 1036, 1047 (N.D. Iowa 2001)
("[C]ommunication is an integral component of ensuring that [the plaintiff] has an equal opportunity to
participate in, and enjoy the benefits of Linn County's services ...."); Civic Ass. of the Deaf of N.Y.
City, Inc. v. Giuliani, 915 F. Supp. 622, 635-36 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (reaching a similar conclusion).
194. See 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2000) ("No otherwise qualified individual with a disability ... shall
solely by reason of her or his disability... be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination
under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance"); 28 C.F.R. § 41.51 (b) (2003) ("A
recipient ... may not.., on the basis of handicap... [p]rovide a qualified handicapped person with an
aid, benefit or service that is not as effective in affording equal opportunity to obtain the same result, to
gain the same benefit, or to reach the same level of achievement as that provided to others.").
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often deny disabled individuals access to government programs or services,
thereby violating § 504 program accessibility requirements. 195 As a result,
courts have frequently imposed communications requirements under the
Rehabilitation Act that are equivalent to those mandated under the ADA,
despite the absence of an extensive universally applicable communications
regulation.
(iii) Program Accessibility
The final significant textual distinction between the regulations that govern
§ 504 and Title II is that the Title II regulation governing overall program
accessibility is, per statutory mandate, modeled after the Rehabilitation Act
regulations governing federal programs, rather than the Rehabilitation Act
regulations governing federally funded programs. 196 In contrast to
communications, however, the § 504 regulation governing accessibility of
federally funded programs is in fact the more stringent of the two."' As a
result, the § 504 regulation governing state entity program accessibility
imposes stricter requirements than the comparable Title II regulation.
The Title II regulation, while similar in wording and structure to the § 504
regulation applicable to federally funded entities, provides exemptions for
buildings of historic value and states that compliance is not required where it
would cause an undue hardship or fundamental alteration.' 98 In contrast, the §
504 regulation flatly states that every program or activity must be operated such
that, when viewed as a whole, it is readily accessible to and usable by
individuals with disabilities.' 
99
Although there is virtually no case law dealing with this issue,200 it seems
likely that the affirmative defenses that have been generally deemed available
as a matter of statutory construction under § 504 would be available as a
defense to the § 504 program accessibility regulation. 20' Since these affirmative
195. See, e.g., Hahn, 130 F. Supp. 2d at 1048-49 (discussing the possibility that inadequate
communication might deny the plaintiff meaningful access to county programs). See also Katie Eyer,
Litigating for Treatment: The Use of State Laws and Constitutions in Obtaining Treatment Rights for
Individuals with Mental Illness, 28 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 1, 10-11 & n. 68, 70 (2003)
(discussing non-architectural aspects of the ADA and RA's program accessibility requirements).
196. See42 U.S.C. § 12134 (2000).
197. Cf 28 C.F.R. § 35.150 (2004) (Title II regulation); 28 C.F.R. § 41.57 (2004) (§ 504
regulation).
198. 28 C.F.R. § 35.150 (2004).
199. 28 C.F.R. § 41.57 (2004).
200. Cases citing to the DOJ Coordination regulation regarding accessibility (28 C.F.R. § 41.57
(2004)) and the HHS regulation regarding existing facilities (45 C.F.R. § 84.22 (2004)) were searched
for the words "undue" or "fundamental." In addition, the Westlaw ALLFEDS database was searched for
the following: "readily accessible" 150 (504"rehabilitation act") /150 ("undue burden" "undue fiscal"
"undue financial" "undue administrative" "fundamental alteration" historic!). Only one relevant case
was located. This search was performed in April, 2003, and updated in October, 2004.
201. But ef Putnam v. Oakland Unified Sch. Dist., 1995 WL 873734 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (finding that
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defenses are largely identical to those explicitly provided for in the Title II
regulation, it seems unlikely that the differences between the two regulations
will afford § 504 plaintiffs a materially better opportunity to prove their claims
than Title II plaintiffs.212 It is, however, possible that the courts might find that
§ 504's general affirmative defenses are not applicable where a plaintiff is not
specifically raising a "reasonable accommodation" claim, since those defenses
effectively serve to define what is not "reasonable." 203 Therefore, it is plausible
that § 504's mandate that all programs be, viewed in their entirety, accessible,
is in fact broader than that included under Title II.
(iv) Integration Mandate
Finally, although both Title II and § 504 include substantively identical204
regulations requiring administration of programs in the "most integrated setting
appropriate," some defendants have argued that different standards should be
205applied in this regard under the Acts. In so doing, they have largely relied on
a footnote in Olmstead v L.C., stating, "[u]nlike the ADA, § 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act contains no express recognition that isolation or segregation
of persons with disabilities is a form of discrimination. Section 504's
discrimination proscription, a single sentence attached to vocational
rehabilitation legislation, has yielded divergent court opinions.' 206
This footnote, which was inserted in response to the defendants' reliance on
negative circuit court § 504 case law, was not directed at actual Rehabilitation
Act claims (which were not raised in the case), a fact that has generally been
recognized by the courts in the case law subsequent to the Olmstead
decision.20
7
Furthermore, as has also generally been recognized by the lower courts
subsequent to Olmstead, there are strong reasons for finding the Rehabilitation
Act's integration mandate to be coextensive with that of the ADA. First, and
no affirmative defense is available under the § 504 regulation).
202. Cf 28 C.F.R. § 35.150 (2004) (providing that a public entity need not take actions in order to
achieve program accessibility that would result in 1) a fundamental alteration to the program; 2) an
undue financial or administrative burden; or 3) the destruction of the historical value of an historic
property); and Sch. Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 287 n.17 (1987) (indicating that the
"undue burden" and "fundamental alteration" defenses are generally available under § 504). Section
35.150's exemption for buildings of historic value would not be encompassed within the § 504 case-law.
203. See Putnam, 1995 WL 873734, at *13-14.
204. See 28 C.F.R. § 41.51 (2004) (§ 504 regulation) (providing that "[r]ecipients shall administer
programs and activities in the most integrated setting appropriate to the needs of qualified handicapped
persons"); 28 C.F.R. § 35.130 (2004) (Title II regulation) (providing that "[a] public entity shall
administer services, programs, and activities in the most integrated setting appropriate to the needs of
qualified individuals with disabilities").
205. See, e.g., Frederick L. v. Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 157 F. Supp. 2d 509, 535 (E.D. Pa. 2001);
Makin ex rel. Russell v. Hawaii, 114 F. Supp. 2d 1017, 1035 (D. Hawaii 1999).
206. Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581, 600 n.l 1 (1999).
207. See, e.g., Frederick L., 157 F. Supp. 2d at 535.
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most notably, the text of the integration regulations promulgated under the Acts
is identical. It would therefore be difficult to justify differentiating between the
Acts in this regard. Unless there were some persuasive basis extrinsic to the
Acts' regulatory texts for treating § 504 and Title II's integration mandates
differently, their regulations' identical texts would seem to mandate consistent
treatment of the Acts.
In fact, no such extrinsic basis for differentiation exists. On the contrary,
the Rehabilitation Act, like the ADA, incorporated findings regarding the
negative impact of segregation of the disabled in its initial legislative history.
208
Even more significantly, § 504 was explicitly amended in 1992 in order to
ensure that it reflected "the precepts and values embedded in the Americans
with Disabilities Act., 20 9 Accordingly, it now incorporates findings regarding
the pernicious effect of institutionalization and segregation of the disabled that
are comparable, although not identical, to those included in the ADA.
210
Therefore, while the issue has not been definitively clarified by the Courts of
Appeals or Supreme Court, it seems highly unlikely that they will ultimately
find that the Rehabilitation Act's integration mandate to be of lesser
significance or validity than that incorporated in Title II.
21
IV. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's sovereign immunity decisions have been widely
decried21 2 by advocates and scholars as posing a serious and unwarranted threat
to the civil rights protections afforded to disabled Americans. And properly so.
Garrett and other immunity decisions of the Supreme Court have unnecessarily
undermined the strength of the constitutional foundation for all federal civil
rights laws. In terms of the actual availability of federal disability
discrimination claims, however, it appears that they are unlikely to wreak
substantial changes. Despite significant textual differences between the ADA, §
504, and their respective regulations, § 504 has generally been construed as
coextensive with the ADA. As a result, claims comparable to those previously
208. See id. (discussing § 504's legislative history).
209. S. REP. No. 102-357 (1992), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3712.
210. See 29 U.S.C. § 701. See also Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581, 621 n.4 (1999) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (discussing § 504's statutory findings relating to integration).
211. See, e.g., Frederick L., 157 F. Supp. 2d at 535 (rejecting the notion that § 504 and Title II's
integration mandates should be differentiated on the basis of the Olmstead footnote). See also Pa. Prot.
and Advocacy, Inc. v. Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 243 F. Supp. 2d 184, 190 (M.D. Pa. 2003) (not discussing
Olmstead footnote, but noting that the integration standards of the two statutes are coextensive); W.R. v.
Conn. Dep't of Children and Families, 2003 WL 1740672, at *1 n.3 (D. Conn. 2003) (same). But ef
Martin v. Taft, 222 F. Supp. 2d 940, 967 (S.D. Ohio 2002) (implying that Title II's integration mandate
is broader than that included in § 504, but declining to dismiss claims under either).
212. See, e.g., Okin, supra note 8, at 675; Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law, The Garrett
Case, at http://www.bazelon.org/issues/disabilityrights/resources/garrett/index.htm (last visited Aug. 1,
2004).
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available under the ADA should typically continue to be available under § 504.
To be sure, there are limited areas in which § 504 plaintiffs will be
disadvantaged vis-A-vis ADA claimants. Most notably, the "solely / because of'
distinction between the two statutes' texts will, in certain instances,
disadvantage § 504 plaintiffs in terms of their ability to establish causation,
and, therefore, liability. There will, additionally, be some prospective § 504
plaintiffs who will be unable to establish that the entity in question was a
recipient of federal funds, and these plaintiffs will be totally barred from
bringing suit. These limitations, however, should constitute relatively minor
impediments to § 504 plaintiffs' ability to seek relief As noted above, the vast
majority of state entities that are no longer subject to the ADA are recipients of
federal funds. Similarly, the more stringent § 504 causation standard appears to
be dispositive in a relatively limited number of cases.213
There are, furthermore, even some potential advantages to pursuing
disability discrimination claims under § 504 rather than the ADA. Most
notably, § 504 offers a more favorable procedural and remedial scheme than
Title I in the employment discrimination arena. In addition, it is possible that §
504's regulations may impose more stringent requirements on entities to ensure
the overall accessibility of their programs and services to individuals with
disabilities. These advantages, while relatively limited in most circumstances,
may, in certain instances, be dispositive of a disability discrimination
claimant's success.
As a general matter, however, § 504 plaintiffs are unlikely to be subject to
either more favorable or less favorable terms in the evaluation of their claims.
Courts, perhaps because of the overwhelming complexity of the statutes, have
tended in the vast majority of circumstances to treat their mandates as
coextensive. Given the many similarities between the statutes, as well as their
multiple mandates of consistency of interpretation, it seems highly likely that
the courts will continue to do so into the future. As a result, disability
discrimination plaintiffs who are barred by sovereign immunity holdings from
bringing cases pursuant to the ADA will typically have a substantively quite
similar statutory basis for raising their claims against state entities.
This conclusion highlights the importance of taking litigation alternatives
seriously in the new federalism era. Although there will rarely be a pre-existing
statute which fills the gap left by Supreme Court jurisprudence as
comprehensively as § 504, there will often be significant alternative means for
pursuing claims where, as here, a flagship statute is limited or struck down.2 14
213. The "solely / because of' distinction could of course also be remedied by Congress in the
event in proves to be substantially limiting. Cf John Dinan, Congressional Responses to the Rehnquist
Court's Federalism Decisions, PUBLIUS, Summer 2002, at 32 (discussing congressional responses to the
Rehnquist Court's federalism decisions).
214. For example, where a statute remains valid as an exercise of Congress's Commerce Clause
authority, Section 1983 might provide a vehicle for bringing individual capacity claims for damages
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As litigators make increased use of those alternatives in the wake of the
Supreme Court's new federalism decisions, the alternatives themselves will
become the subject to federalism-based attacks. Academics can play an
important role in developing theoretical support for remaining alternatives, but
will do so only to the extent that those alternatives are perceived as significant.
In the case of § 504, the need for this type of academic attention is pressing.
State defendants are vigorously contesting the use of § 504 in the lower courts,
most often on sovereign immunity grounds. 215 Academics have largely failed to
address this developing federalism onslaught, despite the fact that it may pose a
significant threat to § 504's continued validity.216 To the extent that they wait to
do so until defendants' arguments gain significant purchase, they may well
have missed their most effective opportunity to decisively forestall further
erosion of the law in this area.
That there are persuasive arguments to be made for § 504's continued
validity is clear. Although some courts have decried allowing plaintiffs to use §
504 "to get where [they] could not go in a frontal assault," 217 there are
substantial federalism-based justifications for treating § 504 differently from
the ADA. Section 504 applies only to recipients of federal largesse. If it
applies to the vast majority of state entities, it is only because the states have
exponentially increased their willing receipt of federal assistance over the
course of the last century. Section 504's broad applicability is, in that way,
simply indicative of a federalism revolution chosen by the states themselves.
The requirement that they, in exchange, play a central role in eliminating
disability discrimination seems only just.
against state actors. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) ("Every person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects,
or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof
to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress"). See
also Nick Daum, Note, Section 1983, Statutes and Sovereign Immunity, 112 YALE L.J. 353 (2002)
(arguing that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 could be used to bring damages claims for violations of the ADA).
215. See, e.g., Barbour v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 374 F.3d 1161, 1166-68 (D.C.
Cir. 2004) (rejecting defendants' arguments that § 504 liability was barred by state sovereign immunity);
Koslow v. Commonwealth, 302 F.3d 161, 172 (3rd Cir. 2002) (same). But cf Miller v. Texas Tech
Univ. Health Scis. Ctr., 330 F.3d 691, 694-96 (5th Cir. 2003) (reaching the opposite conclusion), reh 'g
en banc granted, 342 F.3d 563 (5th Cir. 2003).
216. But cf Zietlow, supra note 13 (discussing arguments for why the spending power continues to
be a valid basis for enforcing congressional goals that have been invalidated where promulgated
pursuant to the Commerce Clause or Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment). There have been several
articles that have addressed arguments for and against the continued vitality of Spending Clause
legislation in the aftermath of the Supreme Court's recent federalism jurisprudence. Most of these,
however, have considered the question on a general level, rather than focusing on the specific attacks
that are being waged on § 504. The only article to address in a limited fashion the types of arguments
that are likely to be leveled against § 504 in the aftermath of Garrett is Hartley, supra note 13.
217. Garrett v. Univ. of Ala. at Birmingham Bd. of Trs., 223 F. Supp. 2d 1244, 1251 (N.D. Ala.
2002), vacated 344 F.3d 1288 (1 th Cir. 2003).

